



Global Governance and Crisis Management in the Post COVID-19 World

Talha Köse

Assoc. Prof. Talha Köse

Assoc. Prof. Talha Köse is the chair and an Associate Professor of Political Science at Ibn Haldun University. Dr. Köse completed his doctoral studies at the School of Conflict Analysis and Resolution (SCAR)-George Mason University in 2010. Dr. Köse worked as a visiting professor at George Mason University and University Maastricht (Netherlands). Dr. Köse's research focuses on ethnic, sectarian and religious conflicts and political violence in the Middle East and conflict resolution approaches in foreign policy. Dr. Köse is an expert in peace processes, Alevi identity and non-coercive approaches in Turkish Foreign Policy, countering extremism. Dr. Köse edited and published 4 books in Turkish and published more than 30 academic articles and book chapters both in English and Turkish.

Global Governance and Crisis Management in the Post COVID-19 World¹

Talha Köse

İbn Haldun University

talha.kose@ihu.edu.tr

Abstract

The idea of internationalism is one of the fundamental pillars of the current international order. Liberal internationalism became the predominant paradigm for dealing with global problems since the end of the Cold War. Liberal internationalism is in decline since the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. COVID-19 Pandemic is expected to accelerate the dissolution of the existing liberal order even further. Three alternative scenarios are mentioned to replace the current order. Revised internationalism, China-centric or regional power centric orders, and chaos are the alternatives discussed here. A revised version of liberal internationalism seems to be the better alternative, which offers a more inclusive framework to address the global challenges. China-centric or regional power centric approach may offer a hierarchical and more security-oriented perspectives to international problems. Chaos is a possibility, but it may only be prolonged since it will hurt almost all actors all actors. Turkey and the other international actors will define their roles according to the emerging order.

Keywords

*Liberal internationalism, global crisis management, Post COVID-19 World Order
international order, chaos*

¹ This study is a translation and updated version of the paper previously published in the book titled "Küresel Salgının Anatomisi: İnsan ve Toplumun Geleceği" by TÜBA in June 2020.

Introduction

Many international relations experts define COVID-19 pandemic as a crisis that has the potential to affect the world economies and politics in the most rooted and adverse manner since the Second World War (Acharya 2020; Blackwill and Wright, 2020; Summers, 2020). Therefore, this crisis will trigger the transformations in different areas or accelerate the process of change many areas. At this phase it is not realistic to bring convincing explanations that may persist too long since the process of change is still continuing. Making projections on the basis of past experience will help us make predictions for the future and help us to understand the post COVID-19 world better.

This study focuses on the changing nature of crises in the international relations in the aftermath of Coronavirus. It focuses on with which methods these crises will be handled with in the new period and what kind of resolution mechanisms can be used accordingly. Under the light of the recent experiences, the direction of change of the solution for the local and global crises in the world's politics after the COVID-19 pandemic is evaluated. While basically making projections for the future, it also examines alternative scenarios concerning the subject. The essential claim of the study is the mistake of getting caught up in over pessimistic or over optimistic scenarios in the environment of current uncertainty. There are steps that can be taken regarding the development of each scenario. Foreseeing these possible scenarios and planning the steps within the frame of certain possibilities will be a more promising step in this phase.

The way the actors within the current international system manage and try to solve the crises that emerged with COVID-19 will determine the direction of the evolution of world politics. In this context, three main scenarios can be mentioned. The first and perhaps the most positive scenario is the political actors who established the current international system and the will see the

deficiencies of the current system and develop a better one with a more comprehensive and more inclusive approach. This can also be described as attempts to undergo a comprehensive revision and remedy the deficiencies, and it means a more comprehensive revision of liberal internationalism. Another alternative is the handling of the disorder and power gap emerging in the crisis environment with a new political will and the formation of a completely new order. There are predictions that China, the rising power in this regard, can undertake a more active role in the coming years (Campbell & Doshi, 2020). Besides such studies, there are also comments claiming that China's role is exaggerated (Allen et al., 2020; Green and Medeiros, 2020; Rapp-Hooper 2020). Furthermore, it is possible that different actors at the regional levels will undergo/attempt such roles. A more pessimistic scenario is that the current crisis will get deeper and turns into a comprehensive chaos for a certain period of time due to the lack of a common approach and a shared vision. In addition to these three scenarios, the hybrid models comprised of different combinations of all three options are possible to emerge. Each option to arise may require different approaches to manage global and regional crises.

The COVID-19 related crisis has the potential to trigger wars by destabilizing many parts of the world. In the current environment, there is no clear situation concerning to which scenario we are closer yet, but there are ones who say that the leading signals strengthen the possibility of the chaos scenario. The more realistic scenario in this whole situation and change is the possibility of the emergence of a hybrid model that is the intersection of the three scenarios. While getting ready for the next period, Turkey should also get prepared to this uncertain period and get ready to take the necessary steps according to each scenario. The actors who are ready for the change will actively contribute to the shaping of the system rather than drawn into such a change. Likewise, the actors making this contribution will play a more active role in the new period. Therefore, competition is inevitable in terms of shaping the new period. The mental preparation for the process and the performance of the cost benefit analysis for the possible scenarios are also critical for the correct management of the process.

Crisis of International System

The most important characteristic of the crises is that by generating uncertainties they force political actors to make choices in sensitive issues. It is almost impossible to keep the status quo under the emerging conditions. Therefore, the prolongation of the crisis period also force the change. Managing such change or being crushed under the convulsiveness of the change are among the possible scenarios. The reactions to be given to the crises is an open-ended process, and such reactions, by limiting the effects of the crisis, may direct the actors towards a positive direction, but also may also deepen such effects. One of the most risky actions to take during the moments of change is the strategy to keep the status quo as it is. The change will eventually impose itself on an environment where the system is forced

to evolve. Therefore, the steps to be taken in such historical moments and the leadership attitude to be exhibited gain more importance compared to the periods when everything is in a predictable order (Ikenberry, 2018: 22; Boin, Hart, Stern, & Sundelius, 2016). Being dragged along the change, in other words, leaving itself in an uncontrolled manner to the flow of change is another extreme attitude. Although the change takes place in a systematic way, there will be significant differences among the consequences to occur for each specific actor. For this reason, leaving themselves to the flow of change may have unexpected consequences for the actors, such as not being able to adapt sufficiently into the system.

Political actors have more responsibilities than ever before during the systemic crisis and periods of transformation. There will be competing approaches among different actors in the international platform regarding how the crisis management and the following order should be handled, however this does not mean that such competition will completely eliminate the possibility of cooperation. In a similar manner, different social and political segments and interest groups within the country will present different approaches on how to respond to the dynamics of change. The approaches with chaos-based forecasts a little bit exaggerated in this regard (Rudd, 2020). The direction in which this new platform will evolve is also related to the critical choices that the actors will make. Leadership attitude is to manage the crisis and lead the transformation according to the interests of the majority by considering both the internal and external dynamics.

COVID-19 pandemic will have consequences in many areas such as politics, economy, society, psychology, culture, etc. There are different opinions as to whether these results will support a permanent change and transformation or whether it will be temporary or not. While some thinkers claim that COVID-19 pandemic will accelerate the ongoing wave of change in the world (Haas, 2020), some other thinkers claim that the individual effects of this crisis will not be as deep as it was thought (Drezner, 2020; Nye Jr., 2020). There is another thought that this entire change and transformation process will trigger the instability and that lots of things will not be the same again (Allen et al., 2020; Campbell and Doshi, 2020; Irwin, 2020; Kaplan, 2020; Kissinger, 2020). It is possible to find various data supporting all these opinions and to make various theoretical and empirical justifications. The most common and agreed up on issue is the claim that COVID-19 pandemic will further accelerate the rapid change being experienced in the world (Haas, 2020; Nye Jr., 2020). In any case, it is a general belief that we will evolve towards somewhere outside of the current mainstream in world politics and world's order we got used to.

This study agrees with the idea that COVID-19 pandemic and its complex consequences will have systemic effects in terms of international politics and will trigger some structural changes. The current international system can no longer provide fair and sustainable solutions to important collective problems, wars, environmental problems and economic inequity in the world (Ikenberry,

2018: 1-23). As the number of unmanaged and unresolved problems increase, the legitimacy and functioning of the current system will be questioned by more actors. The necessity of a new paradigm, a new system will begin to be expressed by more people.

(Mazarr, 2018). And finally, this attitude will force a systemic change, since the actors are not completely impotent in this system.

If the international order that we got used to becomes ineffective in terms of meeting the needs and requirements of the day, then it will be disturbed; however, the formation of a new order can only be actualized when a new political will decides to establish an order with an ambitious attempt. Without any doubt, there will be actors who support such a will and approach, as well the ones who oppose it. While making predictions on the direction of change, the main reason why we exhibit a more reluctant approach to the formation of a new order is that such a political will has not yet emerged in a visible manner. Neither the USA and Western institutions have completely gave up their roles in the order of the world, nor have a new actor attempted in terms of leadership to create a new order in the emerging gap. There are predictions that China will fill such a gap; however, China has not yet revealed that it is ready and willing to play such a role.

The Decline of Current International Institutions

The changes being currently experienced partially set light to the following period. For example, claiming that the World Health Organization (WHO) could not take effective and transparent steps in struggling with the pandemic and acted under the influence of China, the American president Donald Trump announced that his country will not cooperate again with the WHO and that the USA will cease the financial aid to the WHO (Hoffman and Vasquez , 2020; Picheta and Yeung, 2020). There will definitely be comprehensive reflections and consequences of such a step taken by a super power like USA which played a very significant role in the establishment and financing of the WHO (Krisch, 2020). The institutions, norms and collaborations can hardly stand without the support and belief of the actors who established such institutions and norms (Patrick, 2020a).

Discrediting of the WHO in such a manner and debarring it from its sources during a period when the need to for the institution has never been this much before in terms of struggling with the pandemic will sure have adverse effects on taking the Coronavirus pandemic under control. It will be harder to struggle with the pandemics and health problems particularly in relatively poorer countries (Allen et al., 2020). Moreover, there is no international organization that is an alternative of the WHO at this phase. In such an environment, discarding them completely rather than the improvement of this and similar organizations and making them more effective through removing their deficiencies is a worrisome development (Simpson, 2016). It is a possible

development that a similar approach may spread to some other areas as well. If this approach is not stopped, solving many global problems for which collective attitude should be developed in the following period will be harder. The gaps to occur in certain regions of the world in terms of struggling with the pandemic have the potential to re-affect the regions, which are considered as successful in struggling, in the next periods. A similar approach applies to the common issues in terms of global governance such as environment, global warming and immigration. Trying to abstain with an isolating perspective instead of solving the global problems with a common approach may only bring a partial relief.

Another point of congestion concerning the management of the global crises is the status of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The only system having the power of intervention within the legal legitimacy to prevent the conflicts and wars in the world is UNSC. However, the disagreements within UNSC and the irreconcilable attitudes of five countries, which have the right of veto, against different crises nullify this organization at the point of preventing and solving international problems. A pressure is applied on this organization and the actors of the organization with the expression “World is Bigger than Five” under the leadership of Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. UNSC is underwhelming in the prevention and solution of the international problems particularly experienced in the last decade. And this incapacity has prevented the management of many crises such as Syria, Yemen, Libya, Democratic Congo Republic, Afghanistan and Sudan. While the world’s crisis management approach is revealed after COVID-19, it will be appropriate to underline these deficiencies and faults. This crisis emerged in an environment full of serious current deficiencies and challenges, and we have to foresee that the crisis will deepen these challenges even more.

Different Approaches, Different Consequences on Global Problems

How the encompassing crises, such as the wars in the world politics and global economic crises are, managed and overcome will be effective on determining the codes of the order to emerge in the later period (Ikenberry, 2019). And the chaotic environment to emerge if failed to overcome these crises may gradually diffuse to many areas. Even the countries and regions that do not deal with these problems at the primary level in terms of the consequences are not able to isolate themselves from the effects of the international crises. Such problems, due to their origins, may be local, however have wider consequences. Since the problem affects different countries and different social segments with their different aspects, all actors will take steps according to their own priorities and capacities, and they will try to overcome this uncertainty and the crisis according to their own assessments. All actors handle the crisis with the aspects that mostly affect them; however, at some points, there may be gaps that cannot be filled without a broader cooperation and a broader coordination. The systemic crises and emerging gaps can be managed effectively through a collective conscious and collaboration.

The failure of the League of Nations experience which was formed after the First World War and the main reasons behind this failure are very enlightening even for today (Eloranta, 2011; Northedge, 1986). The role of the lack of support by the legislative bodies of the USA, which as a country was among the important supporters of the idea in the beginning, is significant in the failure of the idea of the League of Nations (Bailey, 1945: 84-86). The historian Mark Mazover, who has important studies on global governance, disagrees with the idea that the idea behind the League of Nations (LoN) died. According to Mazover, the United Nations is somehow the evolved version of the continuation of LoN. The issues and political discussions that were handled during the discussion of the league served as key sources and guidelines during the of the establishment of the UN organization and its idea (Mazover 2009; 2012). Inability to develop a common understanding among the influential international powers of that period caused the failure of the League of Nations experience. The period between the two world wars has been recorded as an exemplary and unstable period in terms of many aspects. While some actors wanted to benefit from this instability and improve their activities and turn this uncertainty into an opportunity, some other actors have been crushed under these problems. The lack of institutions to facilitate the solutions of shared international problems and the lack of coordination and lack of security guarantees prevented the resolution of the problems in the world in a peaceful manner and facilitated the occurrence of the Second World War (Fenwick, 1936; Carr, 1951). This period constitutes an example close to the chaos scenario that we mentioned above.

The wars come to the forefront as a mean of solution and determine the direction of the change in cases where there is no common solution approach and resolution methods remain weak. This scenario has manifested itself many times in the past. Once for all, it was the actors who gave colour to the order, had an idea about this matter and put forward more resources and spent efforts to create this order. A similar situation will be experienced in the world after COVID-19. The actors who spend the most effort to eliminate the effects of the crisis and build a new order will have more effect on the formation of the characteristics of this new period. It would be an incomplete approach to think that these actors are only the states or international institutions. Global non-governmental organizations, religious actors, the business world, and even criminal organizations and networks can have more effect on the formation of the new period.

After the Second World War, the winners of the war did not fall into the mistake that they fell after the First World War. Particularly the Western actors led by the USA searched for the ways to establish a permanent and institutional stability in that period and an international institutional architecture that could provide stability in this period was created (Ikenberry, 2011; 2019). The United Nations (UN) and the organizations under the umbrella of the UN were supported particularly under the leadership of the USA in that period and ensured a partial stable period with the effect of the relative balance

brought by the Cold War order (Gilpin, 1975; Ikenberry, 2011; Krasner, 1976). These institutions have turned into important platforms in terms of managing the crises in the world according to the interests of Western states, in particular, for many years. With these institutions, the system that was tried to be established after the Second World War became permanent and many political and economic problems were tried to be overcome through these institutions. Managing the global economy in this way generated a stability in general. The countries that benefited most from this stability were the core countries of the global economy.

The conditions that occurred after the Second World War constitutes an example for the establishment of a new order in the countries that won the war. This order first evolved the Cold War into a bipolar structure, and then resulted in the collapse of the Communist bloc and the formation of a USA-origin liberal world order. This liberal order continued until the 2008 World Financial Crisis. Until that time, both the bipolar order of the Cold War and the USA and West-based liberal world order have formed a relatively stable situation in terms of global politics.

When the general situation of the world's post-Second World War politics and economy is examined, the crises that may structurally shake the political and economic order of the world are not encountered frequently. It is seen that the encompassing waves of instability, such as the First and Second World Wars, 1929 World Economic Depression and the 1918 Spanish Influenza Pandemic, have not been experienced for the past 70 years. The effects of 2008 World Financial Crisis were able to be managed under the leadership of the USA and European leaders. The crisis could have been largely limited with the formation of the G-20 mechanism along with the crisis and the coordinated measures of the G-20 countries. Since this limitation was made over the financial mechanisms, it could not show the same effect in non-economic areas. The economic crisis has been gradually stabilized; however, the effects of the expendable crisis on the political and social areas triggered the rise of far-right, far-left and populist political movements, all over the world. Although these developments caused a wave of instability and uncertainty in the Western politics, they did not directly or indirectly cause armed conflicts.

The attitude exhibited towards the 2008 World Financial Crisis manifested as a revision of the current global economic system. However, in this newly occurred system, China, Russia, Germany and many other countries tried to undertake more effective roles. And this quest has enabled the regional powers to play a more active role in the international arena. In addition to being a member of G-20 during this process, Turkey undertook more active and constructive roles in its region between 2007-2012. Against this, the negative progress of the Syrian Civil War, as well as the instabilities experienced in the Middle East and North Africa regions have restricted the constructive role that can be played by Turkey. The process experienced after 2008 has resulted in the revision of the system at certain scales with the attempts and

comprehensive efforts of the USA and Germany, in particular. However, failing to take the expected steps in the political and social areas and particularly the involuntary attitude of the USA, under the leadership of Donald Trump, on the maintenance of the global stability and the continuation of the liberal international system have deactivated the functioning and authority of the crisis management mechanisms. The world is encountering the challenge of COVID-19 Crisis in such an environment. Riots and protest acts were experienced in more than ten countries in the world within the year before the occurrence of COVID-19 pandemic. The wave of unemployment and instability that occurred after COVID-19 pandemic has aggravated the riots that occurred after the murder of black George Floyd in the USA by being exposed to police violence in Minneapolis. Although the uncertainty and instability that is caused by COVID-19 pandemic and still ongoing, the lack of common understanding and coordination among world leaders deepens the concerns about the management of the crisis.

Managing Global Conflicts in the Post COVID-19 World

In terms of its medium and short-term effects, COVID-19 crisis has the potential to have much more destabilizing effect in terms of world's politics. In the world politics, there are important processes that prevent/restrict the conflicts and contribute to the resolution of these conflicts. These processes can be briefly summarized as follows; the international institutions and associations such as the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), G-8, G-20, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); international norms, rules and agreements; commercial and financial interactions that promote common interests and coordination between the countries; the leadership of a hegemonic actor or the international leadership vision and the formation of the commonsense and perception on common collective threat. Other elements can be added to the processes and mechanisms that assist in the resolution of the international crises; however, it has been seen that these mechanisms essentially come to the fore in solving the common problems. The most important problem about COVID-19 crisis is that none of these mechanisms has come to the fore and contributed to crisis management yet. Beyond this, when the recent discussions and irreconcilable attitudes between different international actors are taken into consideration, it is seen that the current institutions and processes will dissolve even more.

The current international institutional architecture being exposed to serious criticism about its failure to facilitate the resolution of the global crises for a long time is entering into a much deeper turbulence due to the effects of the Coronavirus Crisis. Although there is a need for a new structuring in terms of global governance after this turbulence, there is no actor yet as a candidate to undertake such a responsibility. In this context, there are some parameters that will determine the features of the next period and the management of the crisis. The questions about how these parameters will be shaped can be listed as follows:

- *When international crises arise in the next period, through which channels will these crises be handled and through which channels will the solution ways be sought?*
- *Which actors and institutions will determine the agenda of the international coordination and cooperation?*
- *How will the agreements be finalized and by which process and mechanisms will the compliance of the parties with these agreements be controlled?*
- *Will there be an arbitration and mediation channel to be activated for the conflicts?*
- *Who will cover the financing of these institutions and mechanisms serving for collective benefits and how?*
- *What will be the expectations of the actors who meet the financing and undertake a leading role in institutions?*

The answers to be given to the questions we mentioned above will determine how the crisis and conflicts will be handled within the future of world politics. Until here, we talked about the rapid exhaustion of the institutions and processes that contribute to the solution of international crises and problems. The directions of this exhaustion can be summarized as “revised internationalism”, “a Chinese or other new actors-based order”, and “controlled chaos scenario”.

Revised Internationalism

Liberal internationalism (Dunne & McDonald, 2013; Beate, 2013; Ikenberry, 2009; 2018) approach, as a reflection of the liberal international relations paradigm, supports the resolution of the global problems through a common perspective and coordination around principle of multilateralism and joint interests (Blackwill and Wright, 2020). The comprehensive and encompassing decision-making processes, transparent and accountable institutions and actors, a resolution approach that tries to gain the common consent of the actors, and the perspective that tries to minimize the uncertainties through the coordination and communication method have been the distinctive signs of the global governance approach. We must reveal that also the institutions such as the European Union have been formed by being inspired from this perspective. The governance approach targets to handle the crises in a predictable and common perspective developable manner. It is seen that crises get deeper in the environments where there are no functioning communication channels between the parties and the parties perceive the steps of each other as a pessimistic attitude. The governance approach includes the norms that it tries to establish, mechanisms that prioritize the shared interests and an approach to ensure stability and resolve problems with the institutions that provide transparency and controllability of this entire process.

Having a basic objective of trying to generate transparent, predictable, participatory and controllable crisis solution mechanisms between the parties, this approach mostly result with bulky bureaucratic structures. The bureaucratic

processes surely increase the predictability, however, the operation of these processes and mechanisms in the world's politics only require the consent of the actors to this structure. The actors who see themselves above these rules and control mechanisms do not comply with and respect these processes. For today, the rapid dissolution of the institutions and norms established after the Second World War and the weakening of the global governance approach are related to this. The ones who built and formed the system now believe less that outcomes that can serve their own interests will result from these mechanisms. The new and effective actor in the increasing number and the transparency requests coming from outside make it difficult for these institutions to produce results in favour of the founding actors. For this reason, the actors in the USA and Europe no longer want to undertake the burden of the institutions and organizations like before. The essential paradox here is this: The institutions and norms influenced by all actors will be more participatory and encompassing, however, such processes will both make it difficult to come to a decision and also decrease the support of the actors, who see themselves above the system, to these channels.

The bottleneck that we are experiencing offers opportunities in terms of the reformation of the system that does not function properly. If actors such as the USA, European countries, Russia and China desire to transform the system in a more participatory manner for such an approach, then there is consciousness and awareness for this. In order to enable this system to become operational again, it should be handled with a more participatory and multicultural approach under the leadership of the key actors from the USA and European. In the USA, particularly the liberal and some realist international relations experts claim that the leading position of the USA in the global system can only continue with such an approach (Kissinger, 2020; Patrick, 2020b). The global governance approach, which is the extension of the liberal internationalism targets to handle the crises in a predictable and common perspective.

USA, in order to protect its role in the international system, may prefer extending the life of the existing order by actualizing the burden and responsibility sharing option with its existing allies. This option can slightly open the doors of a deeper and bilateral relation with its allies. In the new period, it may reform its supervisor role in the international system over its normative and rule setting role and financial resources, not through its military power and hard power. This approach is a very risky strategy in terms of keeping the actors in competition with it under control. However, with such a strategy, it may be possible to keep the competing actors under control with a wider coalition and by certain mechanism. By this means, they can provide more support to the American initiatives in multilateral channels such as the UN, and particularly from the Western actors. However, at the same time, this will mean that the USA would limit its power around certain norms, too. This will mean restraint in Iraq, Afghanistan, relations with Israel and many more critical international operations. Reconsideration of the international system on a consensus basis will ensure the improvement of the legitimacy

of this system that is subjected to the criticism such as “The World is Bigger than Five”. On the other hand, a more participatory approach and authority sharing will also mean cost and responsibility sharing, as well.

There are some questions and gaps that come to the forefront concerning the scenario of subjecting liberal internationalism to revision. How efficient can the decision making and implementation be conducted in such a complex and participatory environment? and How will the bureaucratic obstacles and inefficiencies will be handled? How will the power gap filled in the areas where the American and Western actors withdraw? If a power gap occurs, will this gap be filled by the competing actors or will it be controlled by a common approach? If the tension triggers new conflicts during the filling of these gaps, how will these problems be handled? All these uncertainties are the factors that make the scenario of revising the liberal internationalism challenging. Another issue is how the countries that do not believe in these values will approach to the institutions and norms that are planned to bring the democratic and participatory values to the forefront. The approach of the actors such as Russia, China, etc. that are considering the liberal governance and internationalism as an extension of the Western hegemony to this change is a sensitive subject. China gradually articulated to the system after 1970s and strengthened its role and position within this system. However, China has never fully accepted the ideology and logic of the system of liberal governance. And the position of Russia is not different. The Soviets prevented the operation of the system during the Cold War period, and then Russia took a clear attitude against the liberal internationalism shortly after 2000s. Either way, the rehabilitation of the current liberal governance approach and the improvement of the West-based international organizations are not easy as it seems. At the initial stages there may be more confusions and uncertainties.

Beyond all these discussions, if the leaders, such as Donald Trump in the USA, who do not believe in these values and institutions, continue to be on duty or if this approach cannot find support in the legislative channels of the important countries, it will be impossible to ensure the change. It is true that global crises such as COVID-19 provide some opportunities for the rehabilitation of dysfunctional or problematic institutions, however, the important actors should show their political will and should take new initiatives in order to actualize such a positive transformation and reform initiatives.

Throughout the world, particularly in an environment where liberal politics has weakened, liberal, conservative democrat, social democrat and mainstream parties have lost ground, instead left and right populism and nationalism have come to the forefront, and it will be harder to maintain a liberal governance model in the coming years. In a crisis environment, many countries and leaders bring the approaches, which bring the interests of their countries to the forefront and ignore their international responsibilities. Current political crises can be prevented through the new approaches that bring the social solidarity, common interests and human needs, not through the individual

measures or market-privileged economic steps. The effective political actors of the new period will either actualize this approach in their domestic politics or they will express such a populist statement louder. In any case and under any condition, a situation where the liberal approaches and international cooperation and coordination become more difficult in the post COVID-19 world.

All these internal and external parameters and changing power configurations in the world's politics make it difficult to protect and even to improve the liberal internationalism and global governance approach. The mentioned model has brought relative stability to the world's politics for many years after the Second World War; however, it is not possible to keep this system in its current form and configuration. After this point, the essential critical attitude will be the attitudes and approaches of the actors who lead the establishment and operation of this system. An improved and revised UN system and an internationalism approach that is redefined on the basis of common interests give more hope than the other scenarios. For important regional powers like Turkey, the probability to play more effective roles in such an environment and provide contribution to the resolution of the regional crises will increase.

Chaos Scenario

The changes that will be experienced during and after the COVID-19 pandemic will demonstrate itself first in the field of economy. The instability experienced in the field of economy will then trigger the reformation of the politics. The instability experienced in Europe, America and many economies of the world and the collapse of the markets will have serious political ramifications. The tensions experienced due to the increased unemployment and income inequality will cause new protests waves and conflicts in the European cities and the USA. The protest wave that took start in France with the yellow vest movement has the potential to expand to many other cities and countries due to the increasing unemployment, poverty and economic uncertainty. Furthermore, these protests will not only affect the immigrants; the ethnic, religious and racial minorities, but also the majorities under the grip of unemployment and increasing income inequality that would lead to the evaporation of the middle classes all over the world. If the current risk cannot be managed properly, then it can lead to a deep economic and political depression in the centre of world's politics and the world's economy. The effects of this depression may also spread to the rest of the world.

The chaos scenario is about the indifference of the actors, who are leading in the world's politics, to take constructive initiative for the solution by showing willpower. However, there are still some institutions operating although the deficiencies in the current international system. Although these institutions cannot fully solve the international problems, they contribute to mitigate the effects of these crises. Keeping health, food security, humanitarian aid, meeting basic human needs, defending the human rights agenda and the

global climate changes related agenda alive on the international channels can be possible with these institutions. At the same time, the transnational non-governmental organizations contribute to these international institutions. Particularly rich countries and probably the transnational companies transfer resources through these institutions and non-governmental organizations. The humanitarian status will be worse if these institutions and actors are completely excluded or their access to the resources is limited.

Limiting the activities of these institutions and organizations in the global system and limiting the resource transfer of the government to these institutions and organizations has the potential to deepen the global humanitarian crisis. In general, the COVID-19 pandemic is deepening the income inequality in the world, and creating an environment where employment opportunities are limited (Furceri et al. 2020; Barro et al., 2020). Furceri et al. (2020) reviewed the previous SARS; Ebola, H1N1; MERS and Zika, etc. pandemics, and they revealed that particularly the low educated segments were relatively negatively affected by the contraction in the employment opportunities after the pandemics. Another research carried out in the USA revealed that particularly the social segments that are socio-economically disadvantaged were disproportionately affected by COVID-19 pandemic (Van Dorn et al., 2020). The states that are unable to meet the health and economy related expectations of the disadvantaged social segments in particular will face serious legitimacy crises. It is a strong possibility that the wave that is more effective than the global wave of protests in 2018 and 2019 may occur after COVID-19 period, because in many countries, the governments were ineffective in finding solutions to the health and economic dimensions of the crisis.

Another development that will stimulate the conflict dynamics in the world's politics is the fact that the pandemic will increase the fragility of weak and fragile states (IMF Country Focus, 2020; United Nations, COVID-19 Response, 2020). Many countries such as Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, South Sudan, Afghanistan, Syria, Libya, Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia and Malawi that currently experience conflicts within themselves and the states in the Central America do not have the necessary infrastructure and capacity to struggle with this crisis. This will deepen the fragility of these countries that are already experiencing deep rooted conflicts and instabilities. The humanitarian dramas and immigration waves will increase when they cannot cope with the pandemic and similar situations. In these countries, it may not be possible to provide health services, food safety and basic supplies. In such an environment, encountering new waves of protest and conflict or experiencing collective deaths is a possible scenario. Another issue is the possibility that a new immigration wave that will take start after the humanitarian crises possible to increase after the crisis particularly in low-income countries (European Asylum Support Office, 2020) may disturb the stability in other countries. All these developments can trigger wider scoped instability in the world.

The economic problems that may get deeper due to COVID-19 pandemic, increasing political fragilities and disruptions to occur in governmental

structures and security mechanisms can complicate the political and economic problems. The power gaps that may occur in the following period will increase the political and military competition between different actors and even the possibility of conflict. It is possible that the chaos scenario may be actualized even for a short time as a reflection of the change. More important issue is what the validity time of this scenario will be, what will be the expansion of its scope and which steps will the important political actors of the world take and face with these problems.

The thing that will disperse the chaos scenario into different areas and increase its permanency by layers is the abstention of the actors in the world's politics to face with these problems by not taking any initiative. If cooperation and coordination between the critical actors cannot be achieved against the occurring crises, then the crises may become structurally permanent. If the global actors become ineffective against the chaos scenario, then the local and regional actors will try to fill the gap that occurs in this case. The shift of the problem-solving mechanisms to the local and regional level can weaken the possibility of creating fair and permanent solutions and convert the problems into a structural violence. The instability and chaos scenario may not be as deep as the period between 1919-1939; but as this process gets longer, we have to foresee that the problems will become more elaborate.

Crisis Management in a Chinese Dominated World?

Another prediction on change concerning the world's politics is the interpretation that the global power will increasingly shift towards China in the coming years (Mahbubani, 2020). Such a power shift was experienced more apparently over the past decade. If this shift happens too fast, it will open the way for a new Asia centred globalization wave. We should foresee that also this scenario will comprehensively transform the management of global crises all around the world. Asia-centred globalization will be a very different model than the liberal globalization that we are accustomed to. A freedom and transparency-based globalization can be replaced by a security and stability-based globalization. The leaders and groups promising stability particularly in Afghanistan, Iraq and many countries will find support of China and other actors. The global freedom agenda will be put on the second plan in such an environment.

Particularly after the election of Xi Jinping as the President of China in 2013, China takes even more confident steps in the international politics compared to the previous periods. The expectations on that COVID-19 pandemic will accelerate this shift. It is a very weak possibility that China goes into its shell and become introverted again after this stage of its globalization. Stepping back in an environment where Chinese companies, banks, press organizations and mega projects such as the Road and Belt Project spread across the world and entered into a competition platform with the established multinational companies

will create much greater problems for China. The strategy of continuing the export-based growth model also results with some responsibilities for China. Although it has adopted an aggressive growth and expansion strategy by partially ignoring these responsibilities, it would not be surprising to see that particularly the USA will take more effective steps to restrict China. Global power shifts are generally tensile, and even confrontational. In the following period, the competition between China and the USA may escalate in the South China Sea, Africa and some other regions, and this escalation may go up with the inclusion of other actors. In an environment where China is blamed and held responsible for the COVID-19 Pandemic, it is likely that Chinese opposition (Synophobia) will increase in many countries.

Under the light of these developments, it is possible to talk about three different approaches that China may adopt in the coming years. China may help the world economies recover by providing development aid (Kaplan, 2020); it may become introverted or may increase its competition with the USA and the West. At this point, the main parameter that will determine the attitude of China will be the approaches of the USA and Europe towards China. Determining China as a competitor for the global hegemony struggle, the USA, in any case, will try to prevent or balance the global power shift towards China. Without any doubt, this approach will increase the tensions between China and the USA at critical points. The reaction of China against a possible surrounding and exclusion will determine the possibility of the conflict. However, it is also a fact that the decision of the global supply chains and production infrastructure to gradually exclude China will restrict the constructive participation of China in the existing system and will increase the criticisms.

A China-centred world system will be much more hierarchical and multi-layered compared to the liberal world system. Among these layers, the state security and stability will always be in the front of the priority of freedom and welfare. China will want to operate the international organizations and be effective in those organizations; however, it is not realistic to expect a flexible multilateralism and egalitarian participation approach to be actualized within an institutional structure dominated by China. It is the general approach of China to defuse the institutions which it cannot penetrate into and direct or treat these institutions without any care. The main important point here is that China is still defined as a puzzle or a fully non-understandable actor by many actors. This position of China causes the handling of its attitude towards the global problem solution with suspicion. The Chinese reality will become more evident at every stage of global politics after COVID-19 period. If China decides to play a more active and constructive role in the solution of the global crisis, then this reality will begin to be perceived more positively and will open the door to a brand new order. Otherwise it will contribute to a confrontational transformation or chaos scenario.

Conclusion

COVID-19 Pandemic is the most comprehensive problem the World has encountered since the Second World War. No entity or actors active in the world politics has been able to exclude itself from the direct or indirect effects of this crisis. On the other hand, we are at a stage where the crisis is still not taken under control. The current crisis will accelerate the change process in the world politics and increase the uncertainties. The main parameter that will determine the direction of this crisis and the transformation in the global system in connection with this will be the behaviour and attitude that the current actors will adopt in this subject. If this attitude progresses on the axis of cooperation, coordination and collaboration, then the probability of being successful in struggling with the factors underlying the current crisis will increase. In other words, there is the possibility to reach a more stable world order in the medium and long-term. Another scenario is an order where Asian-centred or local and regional actors are more prominent. With their positive and negative aspects, such scenarios can reveal an order in which local values and local institutions are more prominent. This will mean the changing of the global governance model we are accustomed to.

An Asian-centred globalization option will reveal a configuration where the security and stability emphasis in the world's politics is highly reflected. This scenario may have its own strengths and weaknesses in itself, but in such a case, the global problems are likely handled in a more hierarchical and top-down manner. The elements of the liberal international order such as the human rights agenda, the promotion of liberal values, and the establishment of the order through the institutions and norms can be put aside in such an order. Instead of this, a system where decision is taken according to the power hierarchy, at the same time where the common interests are emphasized through the manufacturing and trade can come to the forefront. With a constructive role, the economic funding of the global development and the normalization process after COVID-19 may reveal more constructive and positive results for both China and the countries that China will support. It should not be forgotten that if there are no other forces balancing China, then China will want to shape the world's politics in the new period with much more aggressive approach. In a China-centred international system, the formula for stability is the balance.

The most worrying scenario is the dominance of the chaos scenario due to the neglect, differences of opinion and competition of the actors in the politics. In such a scenario, the declining features of the current international order will be neutralized more quickly. Although this scenario may come to the agenda temporarily, the possibility to permanent damage is high. The most accurate approach for Turkey will be reading the situation well within the frame of alternative possibilities and make constructive contributions to the formation of the new order.

Acknowledgement

I would like to present my appreciation to Merve Dilek and Halil İbrahim Alegöz for their contributions to this study.

References

- Acharya, A. (2020, Nisan 18). *How Coronavirus May Reshape the World Order*. The National Interest. Retrieved from: <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-coronavirus-may-reshape-world-order-145972>
- Allen, J., t, N., Garrett, L., Haass, R. N., Ikenberry, G. J., Mahbubani, K., . . . Walt, A. M. (2020). *How the World Will Look After the Coronavirus Pandemic*. Foreign Policy. Retrieved from: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/20/world-order-after-coroanvirus-pandemic/>
- Bailey, T. A. (1945). *Woodrow Wilson and the Great Betrayal*. New York: Macmillan.
- Barro, R, Ursua, J., & Weng, J. (2020). *Coronavirus meets the Great Influenza Pandemic*. VoxEU.org.
- Blackwill, R. D., & Wright, T. (2020). *The End of World Order and American Foreign Policy*. Council on Foreign Relations: Retrieved from: <https://www.cfr.org/report/end-world-order-and-american-foreign-policy>
- Beate, J. (2013). *Liberal Internationalism: Theory, History, Practice*. New York: Palgrave.
- Boin, A., Hart, P., Stern, E., & Sundelius, B. (2016). *The Politics of Crisis Management: Public Leadership under Pressure*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Campbell, K. M., & Doshi, R. (2020). *The Coronavirus Could Reshape Global Order*. Foreign Affairs Retrieved from: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-03-18/coronavirus-could-reshape-global-order>
- Carr, E. H. (1951). *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*. London: Macmillian.
- Drezner, D. W. (2020, Mart 30). *The Most Counterintuitive Prediction about World Politics and the Coronavirus: What If Nothing Changes?* The Washington Post. Retrieved from: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/03/30/most-counterintuitive-prediction-about-world-politics-covid-19>
- Dunne, T., & McDonald, M. (2013). The politics of liberal internationalism. *International Politics*, 50(1), 1-17.
- European Asylum Support Office (2020). EASO Special Report: Asylum Trends and COVID-19. Retrieved from: <https://easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/easo-special-report-asylum-covid.pdf>
- Eloranta, J. (2011). Why did the League of Nations Fail? *Clometrica*, 5(1), 27-52.
- Fenwick, C. G. (1936). The "failure" of the League of Nations. *American Journal of International Law*, 30(3), 506-509.
- Furceri, D., Loungabi P., Ostry, J.D., & Pizzuto. P. (2020). *COVID-10 Will Raise Inequality If Past Pandemics are a Guide*. CEPR Policy Portal. Retrieved from: <https://voxeu.org/article/covid-19-will-raise-inequality-if-past-pandemics-are-guide>
- Furceri, D, Loungani, P., Ostry, J. D., & Pizzuto, P. (2020). Will Covid-19 affect inequality? Evidence from past pandemics, *Covid Economics*, 12, 138-57.
- Gilpin, R. (1975). *U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment*. New York: Basic Books.
- Green, M., & Medeiros, E. S. (2020). *The Pandemic Won't Make China the World's Leader*. Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-04-15/pandemic-wont-make-china-worlds-leader>
- Haas, R. (2020). *The Pandemic Will Accelerate History Rather Than Reshape It: Not Every Crisis Is a Turning Point*. Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-04-07/pandemic-will-accelerate-history-rather-reshape-it>

- Hoffman, J., & Vasquez, M. (2020). *Trump Announces End of US Relationship with World Health Organization*. CNN Politics. Retrieved from: <https://edition.cnn.com/2020/05/29/politics/donald-trump-world-health-organization/index.html>
- Ikenberry, G. J. (2009). Liberal internationalism 3.0: America and the Dilemmas of Liberal World Order. *Perspectives on Politics*, 7(1), 71-87.
- Ikenberry, G. J. (2011). *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Ikenberry, G. J. (2018). The End of Liberal Order? *International Affairs*, 94(1), s. 7-23.
- Ikenberry, G. J. (2019). *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- IMF Country Focus. (2020). COVID-19 Poses Formidable Threat for Fragile States in the Middle East and North Africa. Retrieved from: <https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2020/05/13/na051320-covid-19-poses-formidable-threat-for-fragile-states-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa>
- Irwin, N. (2020). *It's the End of the World Economy as We Know It*. The New York Times. Retrieved from: <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/16/upshot/world-economy-restructuring-coronavirus.html>
- Kaplan, R. D. (2020). *Coronavirus Ushers in the Globalization We Were Afraid Of*. Bloomberg Opinion. Retrieved from: <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-03-20/coronavirus-ushers-in-the-globalization-we-were-afraid-of>
- Kissinger, H. A. (2020). *The Coronavirus Pandemic Will Forever Alter the World Order*. WSJ Opinion. Retrieved from: <https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-coronavirus-pandemic-will-forever-alter-the-world-order-11585953005>
- Krasner, S. D. (1976). State Power and the Structure of International Trade. *World Politics*, 28(3), 317-347.
- Krisch, N. (2020). *COVID, Crisis and Change in Global Governance*. Verfassungsblog. Retrieved from: <https://verfassungsblog.de/covid-crisis-and-change-in-global-governance/>
- Mahbubani, K. (2020). Has China Won? The Chinese Challenge to American Primacy. *PublicAffair*.
- Mazarr, M. J. (2018). Building a Sustainable International Order Project. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. Retrieved from: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2397.html
- Mazower, M. (2013). *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations*. Princeton University Press.
- Mazower, M. (2013). *Governing the world: The history of an idea, 1815 to the present*. Penguin.
- Northedge, F. S. (1986). *The League of Nations: Its Life and Times, 1920–1946*. Leicester: Leicester University Press.
- Nye Jr., J. S. (2020). *No, the Coronavirus Will Not Change the Global Order*. Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/16/coronavirus-pandemic-china-united-states-power-competition>
- Patrick, S. (2020a). *When the System Fails: COVID-19 and the Costs of Global Dysfunction*. Foreign Affairs: Retrieved from: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2020-06-09/when-system-fails>
- Patrick, S. (2020b). *The World Order After COVID-19 Hinges on What Kind of America Emerges*. World Politics Review. Retrieved from: <https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/28751/the-world-order-after-covid-19-hinges-on-what-kind-of-america-emerges>
- Picheta, R., & Yeung, J. (2020). *Trump Announced the US will Pull out of the WHO. What Does that Actually Mean?* CNN. <https://edition.cnn.com/2020/05/19/us/trump-who-funding-threat-explainer-intl/index.html>
- Rapp-Hooper, M. (2020). *China, America, and the International Order After the Pandemic*. War on the Rocks. Retrieved from: <https://warontherocks.com/2020/03/china-america-and-the-international-order-after-the-pandemic/>

- Rudd, K. (2020). *The Coming Post-COVID Anarchy: The Pandemic Bodes Ill for Both American and Chinese Power—and for the Global Order*. Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-05-06/coming-post-covid-anarchy>
- Simpson, E. (2016). *This is How the Liberal World Order Ends*. Foreign Policy. Retrieved from: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/19/this-is-how-the-liberal-world-order-ends/>
- Summers, L. (2020). *Covid-19 Looks Like a Hinge in History*. FinancialTimes. Retrieved from: <https://www.ft.com/content/de643ae8-9527-11ea-899a-f62a20d54625>
- United Nations, COVID-19 Response (2020). COVID-19 in Fragile Settings: Ensuring a Conflict-Sensitive Response. Retrieved from: <https://www.un.org/en/un-coronavirus-communications-team/covid-19-fragile-settings-ensuring-conflict-sensitive-response>
- van Dorn, A., Cooney, R. E., & Sabin, M. L. (2020). COVID-19 exacerbating inequalities in the US. *The Lancet*, 395(10232), 1243-1244.

