



The Future of States in the Context of Administrative Capacity: Democracy After COVID-19 Pandemic

Haluk Alkan

Prof. Haluk Alkan

Prof. Haluk Alkan graduated from the department of Public Administration at Istanbul University in 1992. He had an M.A. in the department of Politics and Social Sciences at the same university in 1995. He completed his PhD in the department of Politics and Social Sciences at Marmara University in 1998. He became an associate professor in the field of political history and institutions in 2005 and a professor in the field of politics and social sciences in 2010. Dr. Alkan who worked at Kahramanmaraş Sütçü İmam University, Erciyes University and Marmara University is a professor in the department of Political Science and International Relations at Istanbul University now. He studies political science, comparative politics, political institutions and Turkish political history and gives undergraduate and graduate courses in these areas. In 2003, he carried out field research as a project manager in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in the field of the Turkic Republics in terms of the strategic priorities of Turkey. Also, he stayed at Indiana University (IUPUI) in the US for academic studies in 2007.

The Future of States in the Context of Administrative Capacity: Democracy After COVID-19 Pandemic¹

Haluk Alkan

Istanbul University

haluk.alkan@istanbul.edu.tr

Abstract

States have emerged in different forms as phenomena with a very ancient historical background. It seems that states tend to expand quantitatively and functionally in the historical development process. On the other hand, the arguments that the globalization process eroded this position of the states have been frequently came to the agenda after the 1990s. However, the recent developments prove that the state still has preserved its prominence. The COVID-19 pandemic is one of these developments that the state is getting stronger again. The COVID-19 pandemic has triggered a process of change in many areas, from the health sector to economic and political stability, and social relations. The pandemic also raised new debates about the future role of the state. These discussions include both the re-construction of the state and its relationship with democracy. In this article, first, the approaches on the autonomy of the state are elaborated, and the prominent concepts about the state and democracy are analysed after the globalization process and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Then, in light of multi-faceted effects of COVID-19, the state's new role is tried to be determined. In the study, the potential possibilities are discussed through four different models based on the institutional capacity of states and its relationship with democracy.

Keywords

State, Pandemic, COVID-19, Democracy

¹ This study is a translation and updated version of the paper previously published in the book titled "Küresel Salgının Anatomisi: İnsan ve Toplumun Geleceği" by TÜBA in June 2020.

Introduction

Besides affecting the daily lives of the people, COVID-19 global pandemic has created many new problems in social relations, in the economy, in accessing public services and in the exercise of rights and freedoms. As a result of these unprecedented problems, new debates pertaining to the role and function of the states have been brought to the agenda. We now discuss more of the state and states than before COVID-19, make assessments and comparisons regarding the performances of the authorities. The pandemic, on one hand, has forced countries to turn inward, and on the other hand it has triggered a process that required international cooperation in many fields. Apparently, the problems of such a process, which have opposite aspects, can only be overcome by states. Moreover, it is observed that the policies and different leadership forms pursued against COVID-19 can be effective in preventing the pandemic or may lead to results that can deepen it in a negative way. Hence, as the importance of the states increases, the necessity of concentrating on the question of how they should be structured in the new normal emerges as well.

This study focuses primarily on different ways of handling the state's autonomous position and discusses various practices and debates on the state within the context of institutional reform and democracy just before the pandemic. Furthermore, in the light of the socioeconomic and political effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, the study examines the reactions of the states in the context of the relationship between institutional capacity and democracy. Also, it elaborates on the potential changes regarding the future of states in line with the different models that emerge.

State and Debates on State Autonomy

Despite the existence of some contrasting views, the emergence of states goes long way back in human history. The state, which has existed for more

than five thousand years, has emerged in different forms naturally in terms of institutions. Whether it is scaled or qualified as a city, region, empire, or nation-states, a robust yet flexible structure stands before us. The state as an organized form of sovereignty over a group of people living in a particular piece of land, (Bulgan, 2017: 112), has undergone different assessments in terms of its being, formation, legitimacy and function along with becoming a subject of different definitions and classifications. Despite all these different approaches, the state becomes prominent with an administrative structure in which many geographical, political, military, economic and bureaucratic institutions associate together to form a unity. Moreover, in a way to reflect a worldview states involve spatial organization, temporal arrangements, control and decision-making mechanisms and thus differ from each other. In this sense, the state stands before us as an entity that can regenerate itself in the historical development process.

Since its first formation, the state manifests itself with an organizational structure shaped in line with the requirements and environmental characteristics it interacts with. Although the first states based on conquest and field control started to organize on the basis of the army, they had to develop new organizational functions that surpass this. Apart from the armed forces, the development of the tax collection system, police services, regular food production and distribution, the formation of the technical personnel required from the dimensions of the expansion. States tend to expand spatially and functionally.

This process involves a change that we call the autonomy of the state. The main emphasis here is on the question of whether the state which is positioned on the relations between the governing and the governed in terms of autonomy, is an entity that sets its environment or not. While the state was shaped around the abilities and representation of the individual or a small group previously, organizational expansion and the necessity to establish regular rules and change mechanisms regarding this, necessarily consolidated the understanding of institutional autonomy over time. We are no longer talking about *The Leviathan* of Hobbes or *The Prince* of Machiavelli, but about an institutional community and relationships (Carroll, 2009: 557). This can be illustrated in the Weberian state approach. According to Weber, the state claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of power. In a modern sense, this monopoly manifests itself with a bureaucratic structure and staff organized on a rational ground. Weberian understanding of the state highlights the organizational autonomy independent of the administrators itself. With this respect, the state becomes prominent as an organization that operates according to pre-determined rules pursuant to rational purposes (Greenaway & Nelson, 2008: 6; Weber, 2006: 27). Oppenheimer (2005) argues that every state in history is a state of classes continues even today and emphasizes that each state is fundamentally a hierarchy of superior and inferior social groups. The fact that the existence of states dates to ancient times makes it difficult to explain its existence in terms of an exploitation relationship based on scarce resources. As for Oppenheimer,

the *raison d'être* of the state may be “legal”, rather than “natural scarcity”, and in this sense the state is a result of conquest and subjugation. The state has not remained as it is, yet it has changed towards the free citizenship system by passing through many stages. Although the contemporary constitutional state is essentially based on the same historical origins, unlike the class struggle it is distinguished by the fact that it forms a team of civil servants representing the interests of the state as a whole. Civil servants settle disputes among rival classes by objecting the extremes of different camps and making the necessary arrangements in circumstances where social development enables new legal regulations. In Carl Schmitt's views, the autonomy of the state over authority is highlighted as an ultimate supreme entity against conflicts and competitions among social groups who fail to take decision (Moore, 2010: 721-734). Eroğul (2017) argues that the state has to provide internal integrity as it bears responsibilities both for the competing classes and its own human resources. These responsibilities lead the state to penetrate all spheres of social life and to use different means and structures. By creating a sovereign culture in the process, the state can sometimes differ from social groups or reflect them. The threat perception of the ruling culture also shapes its relations with the citizens.

Yet, a consensus has not been reached between parties in terms of the relative autonomy of the state. Even the opinions that emphasize the autonomous identity of the state are positioned against the approaches that consider the state as a determined phenomenon. Although it is explained by different dynamics, there is a partnership among the classical Marxist approach, the pluralist group theory, and the behavioral approach's understanding of the state in general, in terms of the fact that it is determined by socioeconomic process and formations. While classical Marxist approaches have conceived of the state as a reflection of relations of production or even as a means of repression (Dunleavy & O'Leary, 1988: 206-207) The pluralist group approach has degraded the state into a decision-making process that worked in line with the effects of conscious interest groups competing on public policy (Burns, 1984: 526-527). Nonetheless, among the followers of these approaches, which consider the state as a designated entity, there was a shift towards new views that accepted the relative autonomy of the state. For instance, Poulantzas agrees with the view that the state is a means for exploiting classes in the Marxist sense, yet he also acknowledges that the capitalist groups have the autonomy and manipulative power due to the conflict of interests among themselves. The state endeavors for the recognition of the class power that it reflects on social level based on consent (Poulantzas, 1976).

Undoubtedly, the Keynesian view of the state has a significant place in the functional expansion of the state. There are studies that tracing the roots of the Keynesian state to the laws enacted in Bismarck Germany. The Keynesian approach is based on the notion that the market system alone is inefficient in ensuring full employment, and that state's public investments and expenditures should play an active role in the redistribution of income (Barr, 2004). At this

juncture, by playing the role of market actor and demand guide, the state has become an arbitrator that is able to penetrate all social areas through the economy. When it comes to the autonomy of the state, it is essential to touch upon the analysis of the new institutionalism approach that makes the state focal point again and reinterpret it. By indicating that state institutions form a culture, historical institutionalists highlight that the accumulation which renovates itself constantly causes the state to become relatively autonomous and established as guiding institutional integrity. The emergence of institutions as an outcome of historical circumstances and maintaining themselves by gaining flexibility to encounter with the changes in the economy and society, over time, transform institutions into reflections of the state as an accumulation of economy and culture (Beyme, 2006). As such, when we say, “Britain took the decision”, “Turkey tends to do so”, we actually make personalization via state and refer to a broad administrative culture. In this sense, the state is both a rationality and a cultural tradition. On macro level, the state constructs rights, determines and limits powers, set objectives of the economy, builds infrastructure, implements policies that stimulate demand and produces meanings on national level via representations, rituals, symbols, monuments, discourses (Anderson, 2007). The state; is a sum of ideas, systems, meanings, practices and priorities. The systematic reflection of a certain idea involves the operation of political actors in accordance with the priorities of the society and the economy.

As a result, this meaning is materialized via traditions, institutional experiences, other dimensions of culture, administrative units and structures. Therefore, the state structure cannot be considered independent of the administrative culture and the administrative culture from the culture of that society. Culture also affects administrative practices; the same policies are implemented in different ways in different bureaucratic cultures. Within this framework, contrary to what is believed, there is a close relationship between science and culture. Scientific discoveries are a determining factor in the formation of material culture. Scientific change has important effects on culture and administrative culture beginning from means of material culture. For instance, the steam engine, which is an outcome of some series of technical inventions (tools related to scope, measurement, counter, graphics, etc.), has formed the technological power of the Industrial Revolution. This invention, which affects many areas from manufacturing technology to transportation and military technologies, also provided financial support for the production of new strategies (Carroll, 2009: 581-584).

The liberal understanding of the state draws attention to the negative conditions as a result of the power of state intervention rather than the fact that the state is a determined phenomenon. As stated in Rothbard (2004), the only course for man to survive and to attain wealth, is by using his mind and energy to engage in the production-and-exchange process. This can be done by finding natural resources, and then by transforming them to make them their individual property, and then by exchanging this property for the similarly obtained property of others. As such, the social path dictated by the

requirements of man's nature is the path of "property rights" and the "free market" path based on transfer or exchange of such rights. In this sense, the State provides a legal, orderly, systematic channel for the predation of private property; it assumes a role against the nature of man by rendering certain, secure, and a relatively "peaceful" lifeline to the parasitic caste in the society.

Nation-states are the main factors of the political sphere of modernity. Unlike existing integrations in traditional society, new cultural activities based on free individual will and rational interest oriented have created the unity of the nation. Within this framework, the modern state as a widespread administrative central structure act as a regulator in the market conditions, as an intervening force in the labor market and as a conflict resolver assuming services ensuring welfare.

Debates on the State before COVID-19

In the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, debates on the administrative structures of states emerged because of two important developments. These two developments are the globalization process and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Feeding each other, these two developments, both lead the questioning of the literature of the dominant state and sparked the discussions about the future of the states. Globalization is a phenomenon shaped as a result of multidimensional social, economic and technological changes that mutually affect each other. The technological dimension of the globalization is related to the developments in communication and the use of new technologies on a global scale. In the center of globalization lies the rapid improvements in the communication sector and development of organizations in the last decade which can provide the exchange of information instantly at a price equal to the price of the local telephone call through the internet. Norms, ideologies, values, and institutions have been fragmented as a consequence of the communication revolution that made it possible to spread information around the world easily and cheaply (Kettl, 2000: 491). It has been asserted that the communication revolution, has served to spread of cultural homogenization and a consumption approach that can be canalized globally. On top of that, the globalization with these characteristics has brought about cultural exchange. Another development that accelerated the globalization process was the increasing importance of international organizations, multinational companies, and international financial institutions within world politics. These institutions also emerged as supranational authority centers. Global capital is not dependent on any nation, community, or place, nor is it loyal to them. In the past, unlike when money was allocated to a certain region and domestic affairs - commercial affairs, community values and commercial activities - global capital has loosened its ties with a certain region and has become more comfortable in the virtual world in computer banking (Farazmand, 1999: 513-514).

The globalization procedure as a process of global marketing that enables the free movement of goods, services, and capital in the international arena without encountering any national prohibitions and restrictions is an obvious contradiction against modern state construct. Remarks and policies such as limiting state power in controlling the markets, reducing the impact of the public sector, privatizing public institutions, even transferring public goods and services directly to the private sector and international organizations, and transmitting government power to transnational institutions and local units were brought forward as ideological discourses. Public authorities have been forced to eliminate barriers against international market integration in line with the criteria set by transnational organizations. Globalization refers not only to the global circulation of goods, services and capital, but also to the circulation of information, ideas and people (World Bank, 2000: 1). The phenomenon of globalization has created an environment in favor of private sector initiatives in the delivery of public services. This involved the national services provided by international financial institutions and partnerships on the one hand, and the transfer of local public services to the private sector on the other. The new Public Administration approach was shaped by the US under the Carter and Reagan administrations, and the Thatcher period in the UK. These practices were developed by UN and OECD experts and turned out to be a global administration approach in parallel with globalization. The New Public Administration concentrates on business administration techniques and methods rather than public administration. Under these circumstances, public services are limited by the market mechanism (Salskov-Iversen, Hansen & Bislev, 2000: 1).

Apart from the new public administration concept, “good governance” has emerged during 1990’s not only as a political, legal and democratic issue but also as a concept lending policies toward Third World countries as a result of the need for administrative efficiency (Salskov-Iversen et al, 2000: 10-11). Within this period, a new hierarchical relationship has emerged, such as the transfer of policies shaped by the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other international organizations into developing countries. However, international organizations are reluctant to take the national priorities of administration as a global principle into account. These organizations prefer nation-state authorities to act in line with the prerequisites determined by themselves. Stand-by agreements with the IMF serve as the basis for the hierarchical relationship. Nation-state authorities are trapped between the cross-pressures of international organizations on one hand and demands from the governed on the other (Farazmand, 1999: 513).

Although the dissolution process of the Soviet Union did not arise out of the globalization, it has both accelerated the process of globalization and paved the way for discussions around the new position of the states. We can assert that this process has four main flows. The first flow was formed around the approaches that were brought to the fore by American political scientists and highlighted the global priority and success of liberal democratic institutions. Fukuyama

(1992) declared that history has entered a final stage based on the domination of liberal state institutions as a result of a dialectical process. That being said, it would be crucial for the state structures to undergo a transformation on the basis of liberal political institutions in the new world order. Moreover, it was an obligation that this transition process was put into practice through a series of reforms and policies. The transition was submitted by global organizations to other countries as a reform process involving many political, legal, and economic topics and as an assignment. As a consequence of the way the neoliberal approach is interpreted by the new conservatism, the limited state has been put forward as an ideal to be reached in the new world order. An opposing view to the transition paradigm came from Huntington's (1987) clash of civilizations thesis, again from a member of the American academy. Just as Fukuyama, Huntington as well idealized liberal political institutions, yet he argued that there were significant cultural barriers to the transition to such an idea and structure of the state. Societies were acting according to the patterns of civilization to which they belonged, some of which allowed the development of liberal democratic institutions, while others prevented such a transition. Hence, the existing liberal institutions in his views were not turning out to be an ultimate global goal, but a value that should be protected from the other.

In the new era, the second flow regarding the qualification of the state was shaped by the approaches that prevail in the 1990s, which were mostly expressed by the Eurocentric thinkers and, unlike the first flow, spark attention to the insufficiency of existing liberal institutions. Pursuant to these approaches, liberal political institutions themselves have been posing a threat to the future of democracy. Liberal democracy has been ignoring the group identities with its individual-centered approach and was insufficient in solving the problems encompassing large communities. The existing representation structure was based on the majority, including western societies, curbing the reflection of the demands of new belongings and groups, which were numerically minorities, on the policies. Representative democracy was incompetent to produce democratic legitimacy and therefore was seen as a problem area that needed reform (Sitembölükbaşı, 2005: 140-141). The main problem areas for these approaches have been the concentration of the existing institutions on the interest-based demands, low participation rates in the elections and failure to ensure multiculturalism. They have also been underlying that the existing institutions could not comprise the internationalization brought by globalization. They also highlighted criticisms that today the general increase in the level of education of the society can no longer maintain the role of passive citizenship based on the vote-representative relationship alone (Elster, 1997).

Contrary to the antagonism that predicates struggle between adversaries in overcoming the problems experienced in liberal states, consolidating an understanding of agonistic democracy that recognizes the right to defend ideas of opposing views (Mouffe, 1996) or reconstructing democracy with

a deliberative approach that emphasizes the process of decision-making, not decision-making itself have been brought to the agenda as suggestions to overcome. These criticisms have opened up some limited institutional suggestions and practices for debate, such as limitations of the term for offices which held elections, citizen juries consolidating deliberative processes, free fields and civil unions. (Evans & Boyle 1992; Lewis, 1994; Smith & Wales 2000). In terms of their Euro-Western centric tendencies, approaches that suggesting the reinterpretation of liberal democracy, accord with approaches highlighting liberal democracy. For instance, Habermas, (2016: 46-47) argued that forming the deliberative democracy is much more feasible in European societies because of the characteristics they have had.

The third flow is framed more as a reflection of the practices experienced in the post-Soviet era rather than the intellectual suggestions. At some point, It includes regional reactions to the consequences of globalization and transition policies. The transforming effect of the elections to be held in the countries experiencing this process is of utmost importance for the paradigm of the transition process. The perception that political elections in which the competition ground was provided, would be the driving force in the establishment of liberal democracy, was often advocated by those who put forward this thesis (Carothers, 2002). However, the fact that the results obtained in the elections held in the countries where these conditions were met in the 1990s could not provide the expected transformation, or the consolidation of the reverse processes have opened up the discussions about the future of democracy. In his analysis of the results of the Bosnian elections held in 1996, Fareed Zakaria (1997) suggested that the elections held in the post-Soviet era heightened a tendency towards illiberal democracy rather than liberal democracy in most of these countries. Having stated the illiberal tendency which can be characterized as the strengthening of the authoritarian politics that received some kind of public support, Zakaria shed light on the necessity to focus on constitutional limitations in such countries mentioning that the tendency became widespread in the Middle East, Africa and post-Soviet geography. The expectations pertaining to the future of liberalism were already problematic with the free elections held in these societies which went through traumatic processes. Nevertheless, the late awareness of the fact that the illiberal orientation is not specific to such countries is another problem encountered with. Assessment of Eastern European, Asian and African experiences and new concepts such as elective authoritarianism, hybrid regime, ambiguous democracies, elective democracies, patronal regime, neopatrimonialism (Alkan, 2012) have become prominent in describing the new system types. On one hand, these conceptualization attempts have deepened the mistakes of the transition paradigm approach, on the other hand, they paved the way for attempts to produce some new policies enabling external interventions to states or, on the contrary, to strengthen existing dictatorships. In this respect, an assessment of the concept of failed - weak state is noteworthy. As for Fukuyama (2012), the impediments faced during the process of transition to liberal democracies in non-western societies are due

to the fact that they fail to make necessary reforms because of the incapacity of the state structure in these countries.

After the cold war, actors who demanded the implementation of comprehensive and rapid reforms in many regions with a top-down approach initially neglected the weakening aspect of such a rapid change in the existing state capacity. Those who demanded these reforms later associated the crises in these countries with their lack of capacity. International intervention in certain regions with the excuse of lack of capacity and violations of human rights have dramatically undermined the trust in discourses and policies. Moreover, the transformation of the created concepts into generalizations used to define many different countries whether they experience it or not, and the use of the literature as a dominant analysis criterion through academics in the relevant countries, also obscured the correct understanding of the changes experienced.

However, as it is stated, Western-centered analyzes lag far behind to assess their own situation. Although some early comments reveal with an empirical analysis that illiberal orientation has increased in Western societies (Hansen & King, 2000: 396-403), the discussions were brought to the agenda for the Eastern European countries, which were previously taken under the umbrella of the "European Union (EU) with a more rapid process. Yet, it has started to be emphasized that similar trends in developed Western democracies have recently been observed. Expressing the concept of illiberal democracy as a fundamental problem in the current sense, Zakaria (2016) stated that illiberal change is also a problem for the US democracy in an article he wrote in the Washington Post. He further stated that in American democracy, institutions gradually lose their characteristics, turn into an instrument of interests, and that this process strengthens the expectations of leader-centered politics by shaking trust in institutions. In two separate articles published in the *Journal of Democracy*, Foa and Munck (2016; 2017) argued that on empirical basis democratic tendencies decreased among young people in western democracies and that the search for strong leadership generally became prominent. In general, voter bases of the populist and far-right parties in Europe tend to expand. These parties are in clear contrast with the international market principles developed in parallel with the globalization process and institutional rules and structures. Moreover, they articulate that the existing political institutions are separated from the voter preferences and that a radical change is of necessity in this field. They emphasize that the existing institutions are insufficient in solving social problems, and the main reason behind that is the policies of the existing political elites who are in close contact with global actors. Highlighting protectionist policies and arguing that immigration policies are closely related to the social problems of the citizens of the country, these parties predicate anti-alienism on intercultural incompatibility (Uzunçayır, 2017: 383). In Western democracies, processes involving conflict become prevalent. As we can list many examples such as the Brexit process, the Scottish referendum, the Catalan referendum initiative in Spain and the Northern Italy issue, debates regarding the legitimacy of the existing institutions have been on top of the agenda and will continue to be so.

Debates pertaining to the democracy and institutional structuring on the issue of states in the pre-COVID-19 process have been formed around the discussions about the superiority or inadequacy of liberal democratic institutions. The transformation of democratic reform into an instrument of new global conservative policies by the approaches emphasizing the superiority of liberal democratic institutions through detaching the liberal institutions from their foundations has dramatically undermined the trust in these discourses and policies. On the contrary, the second approach, which emphasizes the European cultural identity and the necessity of reforming liberal democracy, remains unwieldy in creating solutions to face the rapid process. That is why, it fails to provide a concrete response for other regions of the world that are facing serious problems of change. This divergence has solidified the belief in the insolubility of existing institutions on a global scale and set the stage for the consolidation of voter preferences pertaining to the protectionist policies as a reaction to the transboundary problems of globalization.

Another process, which can be considered as the fourth flow and overshadowed by these discussions, continues. The change seen in Latin America, the Far East, the Middle East and European countries which were relieved from the pressure of the Cold War on the state administrations, is the main reason for the difference of this process. These countries had administrative systems suppressing their socioeconomic dynamics, especially under the shaping force of the global balance of power. Latin American countries, Portugal, Turkey and South Korea etc. which have administrative systems shaped around different formulations in the shadow of military tutelage, military-backed personal authoritarian regimes like Egypt and Tunisia and lastly the traditional dictatorships are considered within this category. The globalization process and the dissolution of the eastern bloc gave rise to constitutional debates in these countries which were under military tutelage. Moreover, it paved the way for an institutional and political change in which political actors opposing tutelage have a significant role (Alkan, 2019). While in Latin American countries and in countries such as Portugal, Turkey and South Korea the struggle with the tutelage institutions and change was prevailing, this situation has triggered another change that shows itself with a bottom-up change during the Arab Spring aiming to overthrow dictatorial regimes. The change in these areas is quite challenging. These processes, which represent a bottom-up change, have not been supported by global actors besides their own internal problems. Especially Western countries have taken the stance towards the continuation of tutelage and traditional regimes, and have seen no harm in interfering with the processes directly. The change of tutelage and authoritarian regimes that have undermined the bottom-up political process through elections has been misinterpreted as a repercussion of the illiberal wave. Also, the reactions that emerged in these countries have always been interpreted within this framework. Despite all of the challenges, a good part of these countries has an experience of democracy, unlike post-Soviet countries. The renovation of the authoritarian regimes and the inadequacy of liberal institutions fail to enlighten the process in these countries. On the

contrary, these countries try to overcome the problems caused by the fact that they are ambiguous democracies (Diamond, 2002), in which elective processes are suppressed by constitutional oligarchic structures, and that politics has been redesigned through direct or indirect interventions from time to time. Although the unique dynamics of these countries are tried to be included within the dominant literature, the fight against the COVID-19 global pandemic also sets the stage for the prominence of this difference.

Threat of the COVID-19

Pandemic (global epidemic); is the outbreak of a disease that spread over a wide geographical area, more than one country or a continent. The reason why COVID-19 was declared as a pandemic by the World Health Organization is that it can be easily spread from person to person, by posing a threat to all countries. (TÜBA, 2020: 19). Such large-scale epidemics have led to multidimensional changes in terms of economy, society, and administration in world history. Hence, it can be stated that COVID-19 will potentially have intellectual and administrative changes and some potential effects on people's lifestyles and established economic relations. Although it is still the beginning of the process, it is necessary to outline the signs that will help us in determining the directions of potential change.

“Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Director-General of World Health Organization (WHO)” states that “All countries must strike a fine balance between protecting health, minimizing economic and social disruption, and respecting human rights.” against the effects of the pandemic. Main threats posed by COVID-19 listed by the organization are as follows: escalation of racist and discriminatory policies, increase in violence against women and children and along with these groups limitation of the access of older, disabled and homeless people to education and public services, the use of restrictions imposed to protect the health as an instrument to suppress rights and freedoms, having difficulty in accessing the necessary infrastructure and equipment and the lack of international cooperation (WHO, 2020).

COVID -19 poses a recession threat that can simultaneously be accompanied with a supply problem that will affect the whole world (East Asia, the US and Germany), production declines in industries based on imported inputs and overall shrinking demand. With the introduction of digital tools and the transition to flexible work practices, its compensation will be very limited compared to the previous period (Baldwin & Mauro, 2020: 4). More importantly, in every sector, there is a need for people who actually work. Intrinsically, we are faced with an employment problem as a whole not just an unemployment problem. In some needed areas, it is observed that employees prefer to leave their jobs due to risk perception and obligation to take care of their elders and children. The measures taken and the preventive policies implemented lead difficulties in the existing ways of doing business. This

could have negative consequences such as the escalation of xenophobia and populism in countries, increase of internal conflicts, the emergence of new disputes between countries (seizure of healthcare equipment, the sudden closure of borders, widespread deportation practices, etc.).

The first societal repercussions of the pandemic are fear and the loss of confidence within the society. People get estranged from the lifestyles they are used to, worry about the lives of themselves and their relatives, face the danger of losing their assets economically, and even feel that they are in a deadly competition with each other. The spread of such a perception makes it difficult for the administrative authorities to deal with the pandemic, and the authorities have difficulty in managing the process with the methods they are used to. In this sense, the need for change in many areas such as the effective delivery of public services in line with the new circumstances, keeping communication channels that give people confidence open, and developing the cooperation opportunities required by the situation at the national and global levels have emerged. The most important aspect of dealing with outbreaks is the presence of a strong health infrastructure. The pandemic primarily poses threats to the health infrastructure of the countries. Preparations in the health sector such as existing hospital capacity, laboratories, the introduction of new techniques to struggle with the pandemic, the development of treatment methods, and establishing interactive relationships at both local and global levels are of utmost necessity. The measures taken to struggle with the pandemic will directly affect many sectors. Transportation, tourism and services are among the sectors that will be affected primarily. At all levels, education and training services are disrupted, and the necessity of compensating conventional methods with distance education methods raises capacity and transformation problems in this sector. In the absence of digital channels and educational materials developed by countries, the adaptation of the education sector to the change becomes much more difficult within a short period of time. The pandemic process entails an intellectual and technological change in providing sustainable education with the support of digital opportunities.

Despite the measures, maintaining agricultural production and ensuring food safety have a priority in the process. The development of new techniques in this field and strengthening planning and supervision functions requires re-planning of agricultural production in a way that will not hinder production in the food sector, keeping supply chains open during the pandemic, preventing the increase in product prices from limiting access to food. The financial sector is affected by the process as well. Policies such as the prominence of digital banking in the process, conducting financial services from home through these channels, making some legal changes on digital money, providing monetary incentives and support to entrepreneurs and employees at all levels including the sectors that have been considered developed until today, and extending credit facilities gain importance.

The COVID-19 threat closely affects groups that make their living with day labor. The situation has more negative consequences for informal workers. Problems including the production, marketing and sales and faced by small and medium-sized enterprises and small retailers due to the measures may result in the loss of their jobs and then the closure of the enterprises. For this reason, beyond being a mere health problem, the struggle with COVID-19 brings forth a series of economic and social problems. As such, it is required for the state to resort to social aid and incentive policies. States, to put it more precisely, the executive authority has strengthened its own position in cases such as the effective provision of public services, especially in the health sector to prevent the pandemic, in restricting and auditing the mobility and in solving the supply and production problems caused by the measures. Nevertheless, implementing social assistance and incentive policies in the economy has increased its responsibilities. (Blofield, Hoffmann & Llanos, 2020: 1-2).

The aforementioned issues entail the public to take an effective role in solving the problems experienced. States become the primary actors in the management of the process ranging from the delivery of services, their coordination, auditing and developing systems of incentives, to the promotion of compulsory infrastructure and research services that are able to cope with the pandemic, but not profitable.

In the fight against the global pandemic, there is a potential for global cooperation to become stronger and even to be ready for a general change through international organizations and regional integrations. However, developments confirming this have not taken place in the process we have been through. During the pandemic, cooperation, and solidarity at the European level and under the coordination of the EU could not be formed. (Aydın, 2020: 43). Countries affected negatively because of the pandemic were able to provide support more of from countries that are not part of the EU. The pandemic entails co-operation on a global scale, yet there are problems with its establishment via transnational formations. This brings us to a point where cooperation at the global level is achieved through cooperation between states. Şükrü Hanioglu (2020: 24-25), underlines that after COVID-19 global consequences such as the rise of authoritarianism and populism, questioning multiculturalism, the increase of the tendency towards building walls on the borders, the spread of isolation, questioning *raison d'être* of the European Union and international organizations may emerge. As for him, the globalist idealism will not be an alternative to these threats, but instead, the approach of the states to their global roles will become important. On one hand, states are forced to change their existing structures, and on the other hand, they tend to make collaborations that they consider useful for them on an international scale. We can suggest that this situation has an aspect that transcends existing discourses, authoritarian or democratic systems. The repercussions of solidarity initiatives we are unfamiliar with (eg Italy-Russia or China, Italy, the United Kingdom - Turkey) may be a preview of this situation.

Restructuring the State in the post COVID-19 Process

The issues discussed so far show that the two elements which have a close interaction regarding the direction of state restructuring after COVID-19 will be decisive. The first of one is the state capacity, which determines the degree of the state to cope with crises. The second one is the functioning of democratic institutions, within the framework of ensuring democratic accountability limiting extreme use of the state capacity in emergency situations. The different repercussions of these two elements in themselves should be assessed primarily and then the models that may arise as a result of mutual interaction should be emphasized.

The Dimension of State Capacity

State capacity includes the institutional organization required for the state to perform public services, to create personnel, supply channels and to have technological and other material elements that enable all these elements to work in a coordinated manner. In this way, the state can act and produce solutions in line with the problems encountered. The effectiveness of state capacity also entails manifesting this capacity to the administrators impartially (Cronert, 2020: 4-5). The strong state capacity does not merely depend on the large organizational structure of the state, the great financial means or the size of the number of staff. These features can sometimes lead to institutional clumsiness in dealing with reverse crises. Above all, the institutional capacity of the state needs to be structured in an optimal, functional, and collaborative manner. In this sense, the settlement of the institutional structure with the necessary flexibility in dealing with crises becomes crucial.

The structuring of the state capacity is also closely related to the ability to develop policy options. Crises can force administrative units accustomed to working with limited policies, and that they can become an obstacle to the resolution of institutional inertia problems. Overcoming this problem is closely hinged upon both openness to inter-institutional cooperation and flexible policy options.

The effectiveness of state capacity is also closely related to ensuring that different administrative institutions with vital priorities can work together on the same issues. The distinctions between different administrative units can range from what issues should be addressed in determining the policy strategy, to discussions on the inaccuracy or accuracy of the policy itself. Hence, ensuring consistency between institutions is also an important aspect in terms of effectiveness and reliability. The analyzes show that the following issues have gained significance in terms of state capacity:

- *Adequacy/inadequacy of the institutional, organizational, financial and personnel capacity of the state,*
- *Applicability/rigidity of flexible organizational models,*

- *Tendency/weakness to develop different policy options,*
- *The degree to which consistency between state institutions can be achieved.*

The Dimension of Democracy

Democratic accountability is above all a political issue and involves the public's right to determine and inspect authorities through political channels. Within this framework, general voting rights, periodic elections, and legal arrangements that allow free and competitive elections become prominent. These features involve more of the institutional aspects of the subject. In this context, regulations and practices pertaining to the way political institutions are mainly regulated at the constitutional level, the law on political parties, the electoral system, the realm of association and freedom of expression can be considered as the main issues. However, accountability has an aspect of political culture as well. Accordingly, the fact that political actors act responsibly to social demands on the basis of rights and freedoms is an element that complements the institutional structure. While its responsive mode of action provides a better functioning of accountability, it is also of vital value for actors as it will determine the future election success of political actors.

A political structuring based on democratic accountability requires to open political communication channels of the state, to access correct information in the environment, to make rapid decisions by evaluating the information correctly, and to provide correct feedback from the results of the decisions. In this way, the state can deepen its memory capacity, strengthen its ability to make decisions rapidly in a future crisis, respond quickly to crises and achieve this in a democratic cultural platform.

The degree of awareness of political actors and the direction of the awareness is another variable that may be decisive at this point. The financial circumstances caused by the crisis may not always overlap with the demand of the voters. Even choices and obligations can clearly contradict with each other. Hence, the situation necessarily entails the leadership abilities of political actors and the capability to resolve such conflicts in times of crisis in a way to assure all segments of the society. Leadership is essential in preventing the transformation of state capacity into an authoritarian technocracy and a pressure tool that narrows the area of rights and freedoms, as well as it is crucial in balancing institutional capacity and accountability, and in directing conflicting demands to general attitudes.

Four distinctions become prominent in terms of democratic accountability:

- *The design of political institutions in the country,*
- *The openness of political communication channels,*
- *The attitudes of political actors,*
- *The role of political leadership.*

The Different Interaction Models

The relationship between democratic accountability and state capacity shows us that four different interaction models can be established. The first model corresponds to a situation in which the state capacity is high and processes function well in a democratic sense. A good institutional infrastructure exists in terms of equipment, financial opportunities and personnel in the conduct of democracy and public services functioning in such a country. The democratic accountability of political actors limits their actions, and the desire to succeed in the next elections directs them to focus on policies that will use the capacity most optimally. However, as it is mentioned above, the existence of positive circumstances in both respects does not always mean that the state will follow an ideal path. Above all, the attitudes and leadership style of political actors in general are of vital importance in the interaction between the political and the institutional dimension. In the US, Trump's response to the COVID-19 threat, his failure to develop cooperation with federal government officials and even his collide with them from time to time, escalating tension with ministers and other public organization administrators have significantly curtailed capacity utilization in the country and played a determinant role in the spread of the pandemic (Yamey & Gonsalves, 2020). The US acted in a market-oriented manner towards the social content of the crisis, and above all, adopted a different approach towards evaluating the crisis in the intellectual plan. Along with the emergence of the disagreements between the officials assigned to critical positions and the President in terms of the fight against the pandemic, the basis for institutional consistency and administrative integrity has not been achieved as well. At the beginning of the pandemic, the UK officially announced that the herd immunity strategy would be followed. However, the spread rate of the virus and the extent of losses made it inevitable to abandon this policy. Although the UK has abandoned the outcomes of not being able to place the problem on a correct intellectual ground and of wrong decisions with a policy change, the cost of these strategies was severe. In some other European countries such as Sweden and the Netherlands with high rates of mortality, the failure to establish the relationship between policymaking and the use of capacity have yielded negative results.

The second interaction model is observed in countries where the state capacity is high, but unlike the first model, an authoritarian system prevails instead of democratic institutions. In such a model, the perception of the crisis by political authorities is the determinant factor in the fight against the pandemic. If the crisis is perceived as a threat by the current authorities, the administrative elites can utilize the state capacity at the highest level, but in this case, the realm of rights and freedoms is dramatically suppressed. Since there is no clarity about the size of the losses and the methods applied, speculative discussions come to the fore in the process. In this model, the struggle against the pandemic can be successful. However, there are doubts regarding the methods by which this success is achieved. As success emerges within the framework of the authoritarian system's priorities, the demands and freedoms of those who are governed can be affected negatively. On the contrary, if

the administrative elite's perception of the crisis is low, then society can be vulnerable to the dangers caused by the pandemic. In other words, society may face two negative consequences such as authoritarian pressure or openness to the dangers posed by the pandemic in both cases. The approach of China, the first epicenter of the pandemic, might be set as an example of the first situation. China has well understood the threat posed by the pandemic and used its capacity of health and security effectively in the process. Leaving the speculative discussions aside, China's success in fighting against the pandemic receives wide acceptance. However, the way authorities use their powers, the rigid measures of the police to prevent the spread of the virus, and the deaths caused by the fact that some people affected by the disease could not access health institutions due to strict practices cause hesitation in terms of the humane consequences of this success. A reverse process takes place in Russia. Despite the early case reports, Russia adopted a tacit attitude in the first phase of the outbreak, possibly prioritizing the monitoring strategy instead of active intervention, however, the emergence of negative consequences led Russia to intervene in the process by taking strict measures. However, the country faced with the problem of a sharp increase in the number of cases (Epifanova, 2020: 1-3). The lack of democratic openness and accountability in both cases leaves the society open to the decisions of the authorities directly in crises, and this can yield negative consequences in different ways.

The third interaction model corresponds to a relationship in which democratic institutions have developed yet state capacity remains insufficient. The aforesaid lack of capacity leaves political authorities in a tight spot. Failure put governments in a difficult position against the opposition in the first place. Moreover, a decrease in trust to leaders and the system is likely to arise within society. The effects of the similar processes on populist politics, which have recently escalated in some Western countries, are still uncertain. The biggest dilemma of populist politics is that it has difficulties in producing an institutional alternative although it has developed a strong critical discourse regarding the existing institutions and practices. It is likely that such kind of policy will have more difficulties against the current insufficiency of capacity. In some countries, leaders try to overcome institutional inadequacy by highlighting herd immunity and using the current popular support in this direction. Lack of capacity also limits leaders to assign technocrats for the struggle in such countries, and the fight against the pandemic is carried directly into the political sphere. The outcomes of the COVID-19 process in some established European democracies correspond to this model. Countries such as Italy, Spain and Belgium have emerged as examples in which lack of capacity has locked the system with the effect of wrong political decisions. Some of these countries appear with high mortality rates compared to their populations and some of them with insufficient health systems despite all precautions taken. In examples such as Brazil, the country administration tries to curb the negative consequences resulting from the lack of capacity by leaning on popular support (Blofield et al. 2020: 4).

In the last interaction model, both the system’s lack of democratic institutions and the inadequacy of state capacity coexist. Since accountability is not possible in such an interaction, the realm of the authorities is expanding, whereas the fight against threats is limited due to the inadequate state capacity. The lack of transparency hampers access to information both for the public and the international system. That being said, it is likely that limited data will be accessed in the countries that are expected to be severely affected by the pandemic. The president of the Republic of Belarus Lukashenko, stated that they had decided not to take any measures at the beginning of the pandemic. On the other hand, Iran did not quarantine the city of Kum where the virus was first seen, and the numbers reported by countries such as Iraq, Syria, and Yemen remained controversial. It is noteworthy that North Korea has not reported any cases so far (Sang-Hun, 2020).

Figure 1. Democracy - state capacity and leadership styles.

Democratic Dimension / State Capacity	Leadership
	Threat perception, openness, ability to provide inter-institutional cooperation.
	Threat perception, willingness to use institutional capacity.
	The problem of making decisions and using institutional capacity, the tendency towards populist policies.
	Turning inwards, oppressive orientation.

The process of COVID-19 global pandemic denotes that democratic institutions play a more stimulating role for political actors in reacting rapidly, whereas the power of state capacity and the attitude of country leaders towards the process are equally effective on the success of the struggle against the pandemic. In democracies where state capacity is not strong, it is difficult to manage the process in general. Authoritarian regimes without democratic institutions display a functioning process in which political leaders and administrative staff are decisive in the process. In this case, authorities may be reluctant to mobilize their existing capacities to combat the pandemic or they can use state capacity oppressively. In authoritarian regimes where the state capacity is weak, limited openness or total closure gains strength.

Conclusion

The global pandemic brought forward the threat of the loss of achievements of human beings to the agenda and created a process in which states become prominent in the struggle rather than global organizations. States play a determinant role as key actors in both the national level and global cooperation. However, the state consolidated is not the state in general but rather some states. The characteristics of states that are relatively successful in combating the pandemic also provide some clues for the transformation of states in the new normal after COVID-19.

Above all, states have encountered with the responsibility of effectively executing many public services, especially the health services necessitated by the global epidemic. This necessity encompasses a versatile field of action such as using the existing administrative capacity immediately and efficiently, making restrictive decisions, and introducing new policies in social life and the economy. A second dimension of the issue is formed around the question of which method and policies will be implemented on the basis of legitimacy. In this process, authorities can adopt a transparent approach that prioritizes accountability and the protection of democratic institutions and achievements. Or, conversely, they may suspend their obligations, pleading extraordinary circumstances. Whether these countries become successful or not, It is observed that the combat strategies of authoritarian regimes for the COVID-19 pandemic make the society open for the decisions of the authorities. Instead, the necessity for states to strike a balance between the effective use of their capacities and democratic processes prevails.

In the near future, COVID-19 global pandemic will lead to the prominence of states which can practice an understanding of leadership that can strike a balance between democratic institutions and state capacity, be sensitive to democratic legitimacy and accountability, direct state capacity on the basis of flexible organization and institutional cooperation and lastly keep communication channels open to society in a reliable way. The experience of countries such as Turkey, South Korea, Argentina, Germany and Japan which are successful in controlling this pandemic is a sign of this change.

References

- Addressing Human Rights as Key to the COVID-19 Response.* (2020). April 21, WHO, WHO/2019-nCoV/SRH/Rights/2020.1. (11.05.2020)
- Alkan, H. (2012). Türk cumhuriyetlerinde siyasal kurumsallaşma süreci: geçen yirmi yılın bir bilançosu. *Bilig-Journal of Social Sciences of the Turkish World*, 61(12), 1-30.
- Alkan, H. (2019). *Geleceğin Türkiye'sinde Yönetim*. İlke Yayıncılık, İstanbul.
- Anderson, B. (2007). *Hayali Cemaatler*, Translated by İskender Savaşır. Metis Yayınları, İstanbul.
- Aydın, M. (2020). COVID -19 ve uluslararası düzen. *COVID-19 Sonrası Küresel Sistem: Eski Sorunlar, Yeni Trendler*, (ss.41-44), Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi, Ankara.

- Baldwin, R. & Mauro, B. W. (Ed.) (2020). *Economics in the Time of COVID-19*. CEPR Press, London.
- Barr N. (2004). *The Economics of The Welfare State*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Beyme, K. v. (2006). Political institutions—old and new. *Political Institutions*, (pp. 743-758), Ed. R. A. W. Rhodes, S. A. Binder And B. A. Rockman, Oxford University Press, Norfolk.
- Blofield, M., Hoffmann, B. & Llanos, M. (2020). *Assessing the Political and Social Impact of The COVID-19 Crisis in Latin America*. GIGA Focus, Hamburg.
- Burns, E. M. (1984). *Çağdaş Siyasal Düşünceler 1850-1950*, Translated by A. Şenel, Birey ve Toplum, Ankara.
- Bulgan, B. G. (2017). *Georg Jellinek'in Hak ve Devlet Kuramı*. On İki Levha Yayınları, İstanbul.
- Carothers, T. (2002). The end of the transition paradigm. *Journal of Democracy*, 13(1), 5-21.
- Carroll, P. (2009). Articulating theories of states and state formations. *Journal of Historical Sociology* 22(4), 553-603.
- Cronert, Axel (2020), "Democracy, State Capacity, and COVID-19 Related School Closures", Preprint . April, DOI: 10.33774/apsa-2020-jf671-v3, (PP.1-26). <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/340265835>, (10.05.2020)
- Diamond, L. (2002). Elections without democracy thinking about hybrid regimes. *Journal of Democracy*, 13 (2), 21-35.
- Dunleavy, P. & O'leary, B. (1988). *Theories of the State the Politics of Liberal Democracy*, Macmillan, London.
- Elster, J. (1997). The market and the forum: Three varieties of political theory. *Deliberative Democracy*, James Bohman and William Rehg (Eds.), (ss. 3-34). The MIT Press, Cambridge.
- Epifanova, A. (2020). *Putin's Societal Distancing*, The German Council on Foreign Relations, (DGAP), Berlin.
- Eroğul, C. (2017). *Devlet Nedir*, Yordam Kitap, İstanbul.
- Evans, S. M. & Boyte, H. C. (1992). *Free Spaces*, University of Chicago Press, New York.
- Farazmand, A. (1999). Globalization and public administration. *Public Administration Review*, 59(6), 509-522.
- Foa, R. S. & Mounk, Y. (2016). The democratic disconnect. *Journal of Democracy*, 27(3), 5-17.
- Foa, R. S. & Mounk Y. (2017). The Signs of deconsolidation. *Journal of Democracy*, 28(1), 5-15.
- Fukuyama, F. (1992). *The End of History and Last Man*, Free Press, New York.
- Fukuyama, F. (2012). *Ulus İnşası*, Translated by H. Kaya. Profil Yayıncılık, İstanbul.
- Greenaway, D. & Nelson, D. (2008). The politics of (anti-) globalization: What do we learn from simple models. *Conference on Domestic Preferences and Foreign Economic Policy*, Princeton University, 18-19 April, Princeton.
- Habermas, J. (2016). *Bölünmüş Batı*, Translated by Dilman Muradoğlu. Yapı Kredi Yayınları, İstanbul.
- Hanioglu, Ş. (2020). COVID-19 sonrası küresel düzen: **İki** seçenek. *Covid-19 Sonrası Küresel Sistem: Eski Sorunlar, Yeni Trendler*, (pp. 24-28), Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi, Ankara.
- Hansen, R. & Desmond, K. (2000). Illiberalism and the new politics of asylum: Liberalism's dark side. *The Political Quarterly*, 1(4), 396-403.
- Huntington, S. P. (1987). The goals of development. Myron Weiner ve Samuel P. Huntington (Eds.), *Understanding Political Development*, (pp. 3-32), Little, Brown, Boston.
- Kettl, D. F. (2000). The transformation of governance: globalization, devolution, and the role of government. *Public Administration Review*, 60(6), 488-497.
- Lewis, R. S (1994). Citizen Leagues: Free Spaces of Deliberative Democracy, *National Civic Review*, 83(4), 469-478.
- Moore, T. (2010). The paradox of the political: Carl Schmitt's autonomous account of politics. *The European Legacy*, 15(6), 721-734.

- Mouffe, C. (1996). Democracy, power, and the 'Political'. *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political*, Seyla Benhabib (Ed.), Princeton University Press, New Jersey.
- Oppenheimer, F. (2005). Devlet, Translated by Alâeddin Şenel-Yavuz Sabuncu, Ankara, Phoenix Yaymevi.
- Poulantzas, N. (1976). *The Crisis of the Dictatorships*, Humanities Press, Norfolk.
- Rothbard, M. N. (2004). Devletin anatomisi. Çev. M. Erdoğan, *Liberal Düşünce*, 36(Güz), 267-284.
- Salskov-Iversen, D., Hansen, H. K., Bislev, S. (2000). Governmentality, globalization, and local practice: transformations of a hegemonic discourse. *Social Transformation & Humane Governance*, 25(2), 183-213.
- Sang-Hun, C. (2020). North Korea Claims No Coronavirus Cases. Can It Be Trusted?, The New York Times, 31 March 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/31/world/asia/north-korea-coronavirus.html> (18.05.2020)
- Sitembölükbaşı, Ş. (2005). Liberal demokrasinin çıkmazlarına çözüm olarak müzakereci demokrasi. *Akdeniz İ.İ.B.F. Dergisi* (10), 139-162.
- Smith, G. & Corinne W. (2000). Citizens juries and deliberative democracy. *Political Studies*, 48, 51-65.
- Şeker, M., Özer, A., Tosun, Z., Korkut, C., Doğrul, M. (Ed.) (2020). *COVID-19 Pandemi Değerlendirme Raporu*, TÜBA, Ankara.
- Uzunçayır, C. (2017). Batı Avrupa'da aşırı sağ partiler neden yükseliyor?. *Türk & İslam Dünyası Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi*, 4(15). 364-401.
- Weber, M. (2006). *Meslek Olarak Siyaset*, Translated by Afşar Tımuçin - Mehmet Sert, Chivi Yazıları, İstanbul.
- World Bank, (2000). *Poverty in an Age of Globalization*, Washington D.C.
- Yamey, G. & Gonsalves, G. (2020). Donald Trump: a political determinant of COVID-19. *BMJ*, <https://www.bmj.com/content/bmj/369/bmj.m1643.full.pdf> (18.05.2020)
- Zakaria, F. (1997). The rise of illiberal democracy. *Foreign Affairs*, 76(6), 22-43.
- Zakaria, F. America's democracy has become illiberal. *The Washington Post*, 29 December 2016.

