

Citation List: Alakbarli, F. G. (2026). From the idea of Turkish unity towards the Organization of Turkish States: History and contemporary. In Ş. Aktürk & A. Balcı (Eds.), *Azerbaijan and Türkiye in world politics* (pp. 259-278). Turkish Academy of Sciences Publications.

CHAPTER 17

FROM THE IDEA OF TURKISH UNITY TOWARDS THE ORGANIZATION OF TURKISH STATES: HISTORY AND CONTEMPORARY

Faig Gazanfaroglu ALAKBARLI

FROM THE IDEA OF TURKISH UNITY TOWARDS THE ORGANIZATION OF TURKISH STATES: HISTORY AND CONTEMPORARY

Faig Gazanfaroglu ALAKBARLI

Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Azerbaijan National Academy of Sciences

Abstract

Our research on the topic of Turkish unity led us to the conclusion that significant progress has been made in recent years in bringing the concept of Turkish unity to fruition. As the Turkish peoples get to know one another better and rediscover their shared heritage, the notion of working together to create the future is growing. Simultaneously, the development of technology, the hosting of conferences and symposiums that Turkish scientists attended, and most importantly, the bolstering of political, economic, cultural, and military cooperation among the Turkic states have all contributed significantly to this direction. In regards to the establishment of Turkish unity, there is not much that can be done to reach a consensus among the many distinct ideas that are being considered in order to make this idea a reality. Stated differently, we Turks have made significant progress in bringing the current independent and semi-independent Turkish states together to form a single political union. Additionally, the self-confidence of the Turkish peoples has started to return on the path to Turkish unity. The issue of achieving Turkish unity has, in fact, somewhat faded into the background, and what transpired up until recently against the backdrop of the 21st century being the “Turkish century» was not encouraging at all. The main method in relation to Turkic unity is to be based on the philosophy of the Turkic peoples, the Turkic states, and to show the essence of the creation of the Organization of Turkic States. The main method here is to proceed from the political-ideological philosophy of the Turkic Union on the one hand and to show sensitivity to foreign methods directed against it on the other. The main issue here is to express the uniqueness of the philosophy of the Turkic Union in a historical-philosophical and contemporary sense. At the same time, one of the main issues in the article is to evaluate the sources of the history of the Turkic unity and the importance of the Organization of Turkic States becoming one of the new centers of power in the world of Turkic States.

Keywords

Turkic Union, Westernization, Islamism, Eurasianism, Organization of Turkic States

Introduction

In the 19th century, especially from the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, the idea of unity through religion in most societies of the world largely lost its importance. Many peoples of the world turned to national ideas in order to achieve and maintain unity within society. At that time, with the significant decrease in the relevance of the idea of “Islamic unity» and Islamism in the Turkic-Islamic world, Turkism and Turkish unity began to take its place. Thus, the ideas of Turkism and Turkish unity had regained their influence in the pre-Islamic period to a certain extent. If it is possible to say so, in recent centuries, our Turkism was expressed only within Islamism, whereas in the pre-Islamic period, our Turkism was in the foreground. In the current situation, although Turkism began to take precedence over Islamism, it was not completely separated from it. Because the customs and traditions of Islamism and Turkism were so intertwined that it was very difficult to imagine them separately.

In the early days, Turkism and Turkish unity had a general character like Islamism and the idea of Islamic unity, and some Turkish ideologists even made considerations about reviving a unified Turkish state and the Turanian empire on this basis, and even in the last years of the Ottoman state, leaders such as Talat Pasha and Enver Pasha tried to realize this by force of arms. Turkism played a major role in the formation of national ideas among the Turkic peoples without completely distancing itself from the idea of religion and had a decisive role in the establishment of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Türkiye, and other Turkic states. Simply, a question may arise here as to why Turkish unity and the Turanian ideology emerged in a period when the idea of Islam had largely lost its importance. The main answer to this is that the idea of Turkishness existed before Islamism, when Islam was strong, and in the present times, and they complemented each other. In other words, in the Turkish-Islamic world, after Islamism, only Turkism should have taken its place, and nothing could be more natural than this.

As before, the main goal of Turkish intellectuals in the new era was the same: the salvation of the Turkish-Islamic world. It was natural to choose slightly different tactics and voice different opinions on the path to this salvation. On the other hand, for several millennia, religion and nation (Gamlıq and Turkism, Godism and Turkism, Islam and Turkism, etc.) have had almost the same essence for all Turks, including Muslim Turks. From this perspective, it was natural for some of our intellectuals representing the national-democratic front at that time to prefer Turkism mixed with Islam (A. Hüseyinzadeh, Z. Göğalp, etc.) for the salvation of the Muslim-Turkish world, while others preferred Islam mixed with Turkism (A. Ağaoğlu, Mehmet Akif Ersoy, etc.).

Thus, if we take a general look at the emergence and development of the idea of Turkism - Turkish unity in recent centuries-we will see that, as a whole, the idea of Turkism-Turkish - Turkish unity has gone through four stages: 1) classical scientific-cultural Turkism (Turkism studies in language, literature, history, and other fields); 2) political Turkism (romantic centralism and realist national-localism); 3) New political-cultural Turkism (cultural Turkish unity); and 4) postmodern political-philosophical Turkism (Turkish unity, Turkic Council, Organization of Turkic States, Turkish philosophy, Turkish worldview, and Turkish culture).

The main reason for the emergence of classical scientific-cultural Turkism, the first stage of Turkism, was the fact that Muslim states, including Turkish empires such as the Ottomans and the Safavids, as well as the Turkish khanates in Turkestan, were lagging behind in science, education, technology, and other fields compared to European states and gradually declining. Since the 19th century, Turkish intellectuals began to look for a way out of this and came to the conclusion that only imitating European culture and technology could not be enough to escape from decline. From this point of view, they began to study the fields of genealogy, language, culture, and history, which are important for a nation, and thus laid the foundation for the beginning of Turkism in the new era, that is, classical scientific-cultural Turkism. The first representatives of classical scientific-cultural Turkism did not systematically, but rather sporadically,

carry out certain works in the field of Turkish language, Turkish literature, and Turkish culture. However, scientific-cultural Turkism, which emerged in an unsystematic and unknowing manner throughout the entire Turkish geography, soon aimed to investigate the general Turkic culture, literature, language, and philosophy. Thus, scientific-cultural Turkism eventually led to the emergence of the ideas of Turkish unity or Turanian unity.

It should be noted that scientific-cultural Turkism manifested itself in the heritage of our intellectuals who lived in the Ottoman Empire, Azerbaijan, Crimea, Turkestan, Tatarstan, Uyghuristan, Kirkuk, and other Turkic lands at the same time, starting from the middle of the 19th century - I. Shinasi, Ahmed Vefik Pasha, M. Jalaladdin Pasha, Suleyman Pasha, Sheikh Suleyman Efendi, A. Cevdet, A. Mithed, A. A. Bakikhanov, M. F. Akhundzade, N. Kamal, H. Zardabi, Sh. Marjani, I. Gaspirali, and others. In our opinion, the main reason why Turkism had a scientific-cultural character in the early periods and was far from political ideology was that the ideas of Islamism and Europeanism-Westernism were in a leading position. In this sense, one of the first political Turkists, Y. Akchura, correctly noted that in the second half of the 19th century, Ottoman Turkish intellectuals (A. Vefik, M. Jalaladdin, Süleyman Pasha, etc.), whose Turkism was clear and conscious, gave importance not to Turkism, but to Islamic unity and Ottoman nationality in such politics (Akchura, 2010, p. 80).

The emergence of scientific and cultural Turkism in Northern Azerbaijan, which was under the occupation of Tsarist Russia, began in the middle of the 19th century under the influence of renewal, enlightenment, and the initial return to Islam. In general, in the 19th century, A.A. Bakikhanov, J. Afgani, H. Zardabi, and others were the first representatives of scientific and cultural Turkism in Tsarist Russia, including Northern Azerbaijan. Scientific and cultural Turkism began with A.A. Bakikhanov's national "History», continued with M.F. Akhundzadeh's comedies in Turkish, H. Zardabi and I. Gaspirali's "Ekinchi», "Terjuman» newspapers, I. Gaspirali and Mirza Hasan Rushdie's new-type national schools.

1. Classical Scientific-Cultural Turkism And Its Socio-Philosophical Meaning

It should be noted that Ziya Gökalp described M.F. Akhundzadeh and I. Gaspirali as two great Turkists who grew up in Tsarist Russia (Gökalp, 1991, p. 27). However, we agree with Y. Akchura's opinion on this issue and believe that Ismayil Bey Gaspirali, one of the Crimean Turks, served scientific and cultural Turkism more in theory and practice than M.F. Akhundzadeh. In his work "Turkustan Ulemasi," Gaspirali wrote that if one studies the history of Islamic philosophy and science, one will see that many scholars were Turks and Turkestanis. In his opinion, Turkish scholars once taught secular science and education, which Muslim Turks are now accustomed to: "At a time when secular sciences were few in Europe, independent intellectual and metaphysical sciences existed in Turkestan" (Gaspirali, 2001, p. 5). In this way, he wanted to show that on the one hand, the Turks held an important position in the life of the Islamic religion, and on the other hand, they were always a secular nation. In other words, these ideas of I. B. Gaspirali laid the foundation for a new era in the name of Turkism. Gaspirali, whose motto for Turkism was "Unity in language, thought, and action!", expressed these ideas in "Terjuman," a common newspaper of all Turks (Gaspirali, 2002, pp. 19-21). His scientific and cultural Turkism was continued with the opening of a new type of school called "Usuli-cadid." In fact, these schools were the first Turkish schools to teach secular sciences (Gaspirali, 2002, pp. 22-24).

After A.A. Bakikhanov and M.F. Akhundzade (Akhundzade's role in this matter is contradictory), Hasan bey Zardabi (1842-1907) and his newspaper "Ekinchi» played an important role in the development of scientific and cultural Turkism in Azerbaijan. Y. Akchura writes, "The seeds that Hasan Bey wanted to sow in the field of the nation are the seeds of progress and innovation» (Akchura, 2010, p. 87). Most importantly, in "Ekinchi» elements of Turkish nationalism were seen, and the issue of the unification of separate Turkish dialects was touched upon. However, the reason why we are discussing H. Zardabi's ideas here in particular is that he lived, albeit for a short time, at the beginning of the 20th century. Thus, H. Zardabi, who carried

cultural Turkism and cultural Islamism as a living example to the beginning of the 20th century by fighting for renewal in the second half of the 19th century, also made concrete proposals regarding language unity, religious unity, and the establishment of national organizations during this period. Zardabi noted that the main pillars of every nation, the reason for being a nation, are language and religion/sect. If one of these is lost, the nation will break its back, and if both are lost, the nation will merge with other nations and disappear (Zardabi, 2007, p. 22). In his article “Language Unity,” he wrote that the ethnic origin of the majority of Muslims subject to the Russian state is Turkish, and their language is Turkish. However, this language has been divided into different dialects in different places, so foremost, it is necessary to achieve linguistic unity of the Russian Turks (Zardabi, 2007, p. 14).

Thus, H. Zardabi, who gave impetus to the national awakening of the Caucasian Muslims in the second half of the 19th century, that is, to cultural Turkism, considered it important to unite Russia, including the Caucasian Turks, around the unity of language-nation and religion-Islam in the 1900s as a continuation of this work. His efforts to prove his existence as a separate nation and to promote national unity as a national ideologist during this period by educating the Azerbaijani Turks are particularly noteworthy. From this perspective, H. Zardabi is unequivocally the ideologist and teacher of the Azerbaijani Turks who grew up in the 20th century - A. Huseynzade, A. Aghaoglu, M. A. Rasulzadeh, and others. We also completely agree with the opinion of H. Zardabi’s researcher, Doctor of Philosophy Prof. Izzet Rustamov, that “Zardabi is one of the titans-giants born of the realities of the 19th century in Azerbaijan, including Russia as a whole, and in the East» (Rustamov, 2012, p. 186).

2. Political Turkism: Romantic Centralism And Realistic

At the beginning of the 20th century, especially in the 1900s-1910s, Turkism in the Turkic world entered the second stage-political-ideological Turkism. Unlike the second half of the 19th century, at the beginning of the 20th century, the followers of Turkism fought for this idea in the Ottoman Empire, Azerbaijan, Crimea, Tatarstan, Turkestan, and other Turkish lands, as well as outside the Turkish geography-in Egypt, Afghanistan, France, and other countries-accepting it as a single ideological line of all Turks. For example, Hilmi Tunali, A. Huseynzade, Y. Akchura, H.S. Ayvazov, A. Aghaoglu, Ziya Gökalp, and others defended Turkism with the same desire and principle in Istanbul, Baku, Kazan, Bakhchasaray, Bukhara, Samarkand, Tabriz, Tehran, Cairo, Moscow, Budapest, Vienna, Paris, and other cities. In this sense, political-ideological Turkism aimed at at least the spiritual-ideological unity of all Turkic peoples. However, we would also like to note here that political-ideological Turkism emerged in two directions: 1) political romantics who desired a unified Turanian-Turkic state (centralism); 2) national-local Turkists (national-localism) who advocated the creation of separate independent Turkish states.

At the beginning of the 20th century, the first ideologist of Turkism, or to be more precise, of political-ideological Turkism, which was theoretically intertwined with Islam, was Yusif Akchura, one of the Northern Turks. In his work “Three Styles of Politics” (1904), Y. Akchura, who developed the theoretical foundations of political Turkism, noted that the idea of creating a Turkish political nationality based on race is very new; so far, this idea has not existed in any Turkish state, especially the Ottoman Empire, and the cadres who have recently appeared in Istanbul who aspired to Turkish nationality have been more scientific specialists (Ş. Sami, N. Asim, V. Çelebi, etc.) than political ones (Akchura, 2010, p. 189). Saying, “No matter what, the idea of a political nationality based on race bears fruit,” Yusif Bey openly rejected the idea of the “Ottoman nation” and focused on Turkism (Turkish unity) and Islamism (Islamic unity). Despite some hesitations about which of these to give priority to, Yusif Bey ultimately came to the conclusion that for many reasons, Turkish unity is more realistic than Islamic unity for the Turkic world, including Ottoman Türkiye (Christian states not wanting Islamic unity, etc.). (Akchura, 2010, p. 192).

It should be noted that Hasan Sabri Ayvazov, one of the Crimean Turks, like Y. Akchura and A. Hüseyinzadeh, advocated the unity of the Turks and the creation of a common Turkish language, speaking from political-

ideological Turkism. Ayvazov, who put forward these ideas in the national press published in Baku (“Hayat,” “Füyuzat,” etc.), wrote that the Turks should foremost unite on the basis of nation and religion. In his work “Why did we get to this point?,” Ayvazov openly declared that the salvation of the Turks lies neither in socialism nor in a similar alien trend, but in a progressive Islamic-Turkish unity (Ayvazov, 2006, p. 188). In this regard, Ayvazov, like A. Huseynzade, defended the idea of creating a common Turkish language. For example, he wrote that it was not right for those who came together in the “Union of Russian Muslims,” which came out of the Islamic-Turkish unity, to speak Russian more than Turkish (Ayvazov, 2006, p. 190). In Ayvazov’s opinion, since nationality is very sacred, happiness should be desired together with nationality; however, at the same time, nationality should be loved with Islam, and Islam with humanity.

Among the Azerbaijani Turks, one of the first intellectuals who inclined towards political-ideological Turkism, along with Islamism, was Ahmed Bey Ağaoğlu. The main factor in his turning towards Turkism, along with “Islamic nationalism,” was the policy of Russification and Persianization in the Caucasus, the Armenian-Muslim conflict, and the process of national self-awareness. While “Islamic nationalism” was as important as keeping all Muslim peoples together as a single culture, a single idea, and a single religious-political nation, it also made Turkism necessary in order to withstand the wars launched against the Turkish existence from all sides. In Ağaoğlu’s view, Turkism was not an artificial nationalism but an idea that resonated with Islamism (Ağaoğlu, 2019, p. 119). In his article “National Issue in the Caucasus,” he wrote that there is good and bad nationalism: “The first is involuntary sympathy for people with whom you are connected by love for the homeland, by language, by blood, by common traditions, and by allegiance. Nature itself creates this kind of nationalism, and no capital or newspaper has any business here. Since it is natural, such nationalism is both beautiful and benevolent. It does not go beyond the desire to do good, to serve the homeland, and to sacrifice oneself, time, and strength for its sake. However, there is also bad nationalism—an irreconcilable nationalism that leads to enmity, hatred, hatred of others, and oppression. Such nationalism is artificial, unnatural, and created by people and capital” (Ağaoğlu, 2019, p. 123).

In his article “The Moon That Makes the Moon,” Ağaoğlu spoke out as a defender not only of Islam but also of Turkism and showed the reasons for this: “When it comes to the issue of Turkism and Muslimism, the Menshikovs should know that we are Muslims and Turks. There is nothing in either Islam or Turkism that would make us hide our Muslimism and Turkism. Islam is one of the first religions in the world. It has such a humanity that brings nothing but pride and happiness to a person. What is there in Islam that we should be ashamed of and hide our being Muslims? The Menshikovs do not like Islam. I do not like Christianity either. They are on their own path, and I am on my own path. Neither they nor I can find any reproach or reproach for this. The Turkish tribe is clearly the largest, most mature, most capable, most important, and first tribe among the Muslims in Asia and Africa. With Turkism, we can only “One can be proud of it” (Ağaoğlu, 2019, pp. 236-237). He wrote that Turkishness is a feeling that no one can take away from a Turk by force: “Even if we are Turks, our heart and inclination are in the world, and wherever there is a Turk, it is for him. This is a natural feeling. No power or force in the world can take it away from us” (Ağaoğlu, 2019, p. 241).

It should be noted that while A. Ağaoğlu was in Türkiye in 1910-1918, he paid more attention to the issue of the integrity of Islamism and Turkism, especially in his articles in the “Türk Yurd” magazine under the title “Türk alemi.” In his opinion, supporters of the Islamic movement should know that the nationalist movement also has influence among the public:

Since the agent of Islam is formed from various nations, it is quite natural that the unified universal power, authority, and culture are proportional to the strength and steadfastness of the members and peoples that make it up. The stronger and more steadfast the Islamic nations are, the more the general body of Islam gains strength and steadfastness in the same proportion. Serving the nation actually means serving Islam. (Ağaoğlu, 1912, pp. 198-199)

Thus, Ağaoğlu expressed his objection to those who pitted Turkism against Islamism and Islamism against Turkism. He believed that the most important factor strengthening Islamism was nationality, that is, Turkishness. If they were pitted against each other, both would collapse. In this sense, Ağaoğlu defended the idea that nationality should be strong in order for Islamism to be strong. An indispensable point here is that Ağaoğlu was a supporter of Islamic-Turkish unity for a while. Apparently, this is why Ağaoğlu, speaking from Islamic-Turkish unity, did not show much sympathy for ethnic Turkism, that is, the idea of the creation of separate Turkish states.

At the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, the great ideologist of Islamism and Turkism was Ali bey Huseynzade. He mainly propagated scientific-cultural Turkism and Turanism until the 1st Russian Revolution (1905) (Hüseynzadeh, 2007, p. 32). In the early days, A. Huseynzadeh, who was considered more of a cultural and poetic Turanist, became an ideologist of Turkism on the eve of the Russo-Japanese War (Akchura, 2010, p. 208). In general, it is necessary to distinguish two directions in A. Huseynzadeh's theoretical and philosophical creativity: 1) the "triad" formula formulated as "Islamization, Turkization, and Europeanization" and 2) the ideas of "Ottoman Turkism."

In his article "Mektubi-makhsus," sent to the "Turk" newspaper published in Egypt in November 1904, A. Huseynzadeh first indicated that, with some exceptions, he generally agreed with Y. Akchura's ideology of "Ottomanism, Islamism, and Turkism" in his work "Three Styles-Politics." Thus, A. Huseynzadeh, like Y. Akchura, rejected the idea of the "Ottoman nation" and focused his attention on modern-spirited Islamism and Turkism and considered it necessary for a new idea to be created on the basis of the integrity of Islam and Turkism. At the same time, A. Huseynzade objected to Yusif Bey's "triple" program, which took Islamism and Turkism out of the unity of the two and politicized them separately. A. Huseynzade believed that it was not right to politicize this issue, especially to divide it into Islamism and Turkism. In this sense, he opposed the creation of separate ideas of "Islamism" and "Turkism": "What is the need for artificially inventing separate professions under the names of pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism?" he said (Huseynzadeh, 2007, p. 30).

From this perspective, although Huseynzadeh expressed that he saw Islam and Turkism as a whole, he considered it important for the Turks to recognize their national identity (Turkism) and religion (Muslimism) from a political perspective:

If Muslims, and especially Turks, wherever they are, whether in the Ottoman Empire, Turkestan, around Lake Baikal, or around Karakorum, would recognize each other (i.e., that they are of the same Turkish lineage – F.A.), would strive to explain the "Holy Quran" by reducing sectarian bigotry under the names of Sunnism, Shiism, and I don't know what else, and would know that the basis of religion is the Quran (i.e., their true Islam – F.A.), wouldn't they give up?. (Huseynzadeh, 2007, p. 30)

A. Huseynzadeh, in addition to proceeding from the idea of national-religious integrity, considered it important to understand Islam and Turkism separately: "If our Muslims, our religious brothers for whom we are well-wishers everywhere in the world, progress, we applaud that progress with all our hearts! We are Turks; therefore, we are Turks. We wish that Turks everywhere be happy with progress and evolution" (Huseynzadeh, 2007, p. 35). Thus, Huseynzadeh, in a certain sense, distinguished the concepts of "ummah" and "nation" from each other and tried to bring scientific precision and concreteness to the latter concept (Balayev, 2011, p. 37).

M. A. Rasulzadeh, Y. Akchura, Z. Gökalp, M. B. Mammadzadeh, and others believe that A. Huseynzade, by saying in the magazine "Füyuzat," published in 1906-1907, "Let us be a person with Islamic beliefs, Turkish blood, and European appearance" (Huseynzade, 2007, p. 255), laid the foundation for the idea of "Turkification, Islamization, and modernization," which became the common ideology of all Turkic peoples. According to this "triple" formula of A. Huseynzadeh, every Muslim-Turk should act from a modern-spirited national and religious unity. Because in A. Huseynzadeh's ideological and philosophical

views, national and religious identity were taken together. A. Huseynzadeh explained this by saying that most Turks, except for Islam, did not show any serious inclination or talent for other religions, and those who did even forgot their ethnic origin. However, Muslim Turks became an important pillar of the Islamic world and preserved their tribe and nationality (Huseynzadeh, 2007, p. 57). In this regard, A. Huseynzadeh wrote in 1906, "Who are the Turks, and what do they consist of?" He wrote in his work, "The Turkish rule (Turkish rules) is so simple, so beautiful, and so logical that it was obvious that a Turk who embraced it would never abandon the moment and accept the rules of the Arab. It is for these reasons that the Turks, although they embraced the religion-the pure Islam-with such enthusiasm and zeal as if they had separated it from their own spirit and morality and become its strong protectors, never became Arabized. They were able to preserve their ethnic-noble-originality, but only on that path did they begin to manifest progress (Huseynzadeh, 1997, p. 226).

In the 1900s-1910s, no matter how much A. Hüseyinzadeh spoke of a modern-spirited Turkish-Islamic unity, he realized the uncertainty of its goals and defended the idea of "Ottoman Turkism," which was closer to concreteness in comparison. This, to some extent, was in line with the idea of the unification of all Turks in the Turanian state (Turanism-"pan-"pan-Turanism). In this regard, we would like to especially note one issue: in the political-ideological sense, A. Huseynzadeh defended not the "Ottoman nation" or "Ottoman nationalism" but "Ottoman Turkism" with its center in Istanbul. Because while the "Ottoman nation" also reflected non-Turks, "Ottoman Turkism" expressed the influence of the Ottoman Empire on other Turkish communities. Y. Akchura writes, "Especially from the content and form of his articles published in "Füyuzat," it is immediately decided that Huseynzade Ali Bey is a Turk, a Turkist, even an Ottomanist. He wants the spread of Ottoman Turkish among all Turks, that the literary language of all Turks should be Ottoman Turkish, and he himself writes his articles in a very pure Ottoman literary Turkish, in the style of the new literary cadidda that was authoritative in Istanbul at that time. Politically, he considers the Ottoman state, Ottoman Turkism, to be the core of independent Turkism. From this point of view, his view on the whole issue of Turkism is close to the Turkism idea of "three styles (Akchura, 2010, p. 210).

However, unlike Akchura, A. Huseynzade insisted that the political-ideological core of Turkism was not Russia, but Ottoman Türkiye. A. Huseynzadeh, who indicated that the Turkish countries and Turks in Russia were in political bondage as a reason, believed that only in a politically and legally independent Turkish state could Turkism develop and unite other Turkic peoples around itself. In his opinion, the awakening, development, and rise of the Turkish-Islamic world in the near future are connected with the Ottoman state, Ottoman Turkism. If Turkish Turkism becomes a political power and ideological center for all Turks, then Russian Turks, including Azerbaijani Turks and other Turkic peoples, will also benefit from this. In this regard, an independent and ideologically more organized "Ottoman Turkism" can play the central role in the entire Turkic world. At the same time, he opposed "Ottoman Turkism" and Turanism to the policy of Russification carried out among Russian Turks, including Azerbaijani Turks. In other words, he put forward these ideas over the past 60-70 years in the Caucasus against the Russification and Christianization of Tsarist Russia, as well as the recently strengthened Iranianism or Persianization ideology in Southern Azerbaijan.

This once again shows that in terms of the ideology of national-religious unity put forward for the liberation of the Muslim and Turkic world, while A. Ağaoğlu gave priority to political Islamism and Y. Akchura to political Turkism, A. Huseynzadeh, at first glance, unlike them, came out from the position of unity of Turkish-Islamic unity, that is, from the "dual" formula. However, Akchura, who realized that this was so on the surface, noted that in reality A. Huseynzadeh, like him, was more a supporter of the idea of Turkism and was even the first creator of the "cultural and political Turkism movement" among Azerbaijani Turks (Akchura, 2010, pp. 203-204). In our opinion, it is not accidental that Y. Akchura describes A. Huseynzadeh here as the first founder of the "cultural and political Turkism movement" rather than the political Turkism movement. This once again shows that in 1900-1910, the Turkism movement in Azerbaijan, far from being specific (Azerbaijani Turkism-Azerbaijanism), had a more general Turkism (moral and ideological unity of

all Turks) character, and this movement was transformed into a national form in our homeland only in 1910-1920 and emerged in a political and ideological sense as the idea of Azerbaijani Turkism - Azerbaijaniism.

From this perspective, the main factor that led A. Huseynzade to see "Ottoman Turkism" in 1900-1910 as the awakening and unity of the entire Turkic-Islamic world was related to their political independence and power, unlike other Turkic peoples (Azerbaijani Turks, Crimean Turks, Turkestan Turks, Iranian Turks, etc.). He believed that only if Turkish Turkism becomes a power and ideological center for all Turkic nations will other Turkic countries, including Azerbaijani Turks, succeed. In this sense, we do not agree with the opinion of some authors that Huseynzadeh tried to merge other Turkic nations into the Ottoman nation with the idea of "Ottoman Turkism" based on Turkish unity (Balayev, 2011, p. 27). In our opinion, A. Huseynzadeh's taking "Ottoman Turkism" as the core of all Turkism should not be viewed as a contradiction of Azerbaijani Turkism, but rather as a driving factor. M.A. Rasulzadeh correctly noted that at that time the idea of general Turkism put forward by A. Huseynzadeh, A. Aghaoglu, and their like-minded people created a love of independence in the separate Turkic ethnic groups (Azerbaijanis, Crimeans, Tatars, Turkmens, etc.) and revolutionized them: "However, they could not even speak of freedom and independence individually, fearing the great power of the nations in front of them. However, the realization that they were not small nations but members of a multimillion-strong nation with a famous history and future naturally increased their hopes and called for a confrontation with the oil of the century" (Rasulzadeh, 2012/1, p. 52).

This means that although A. Huseynzadeh did not defend the idea of the creation of separate Turkic states at that time, he was not unequivocally against it either. Simply, A. Huseynzadeh, proceeding from the realities of the time, tried to strengthen and consolidate the only independent Turkish Turkism, and emphasized the importance of other Turkic nations supporting him on this path. From this perspective, he considered that the Turkish-Tatar peoples under the enslavement of Tsarist Russia should also defend Turkish Turkism, first of all. In our opinion, this consideration was a realistic view for that period in terms of the theory of Turkism. Because for national thinkers, including A. Huseynzadeh, who had just begun to separate Turkism from each other with the idea of "Islamic unity" and sometimes did this unwillingly, the fragmentation of the spirit of Turkism, that is, its division into separate ethnic-national Turkisms, was a very foreign and distant feeling. The national ideologist Rasulzadeh, who assessed these issues very correctly, wrote: "The Turkish socio-political thought, freed from Pan-Islamism, could not have suddenly reached the real national idea that it has reached now. This is clear from a psychological point of view. In conditions of war and general danger, nationalists who refused such a grand and comprehensive slogan as "Islamic unity" should have put forward a slogan with the same impact instead. This could only be national unity: "The era of religious unity has passed, now history is leading nations-nations forward. Long live the unity of the Turkic nations from the Danube to Altai!" (Rasulzadeh, 2012/1, pp. 51-52).

The transition from centralist Turkism to national-local Turkism occurred only when, in 1911-1913, the Ottoman Empire was defeated, first in the Balkans and then in World War I, thereby losing both the ideological core of Turkism and the power to transform into a unified Turkish state. This was the beginning of a new era in Turkism, and many Turkists significantly moved away from political "romantic-centralist" Turkism (Turkic unity-unified Turanian state) and tended towards "realistic national-local" Turkism (independent Turkish states). It is true that A. Huseynzadeh remained loyal to "romantic-centralist" Turkism in this case as well. However, this did not prevent Huseynzadeh from accepting Azerbaijani Turkism and its result, the Republic of Azerbaijan (Huseynzadeh, 2008, p. 367). According to Huseynzadeh, who accepted the union of Azerbaijani and Turkish Turks in the spring of 1918 as a historical event and a natural trend, the entire Turkish nation would be modernized, strengthened, and unified by the fusion of both Turkish peoples. Thus, Azerbaijan, which became the tragic center of activity of imperialism, nationalism, and socialism, did not know what to do under these various destructive and oppressive trends and lost its judgment. However, with the help of Turkish Turks, not only Azerbaijan but also Turkish Turks were saved (Huseynzadeh, 2008, p. 367).

A. Huseynzadeh almost did not deviate from the ideological line he held (Turkish unity centered on Türkiye) during the period of emigration in Türkiye in the 1920s-1940s. Simply, the restriction of the activities of the “Turkish hearth” and “Turkish homeland” as a result of the forced agreement of Atatürk’s Türkiye with Western countries-in short, the prohibitions on the promotion of Turkishness only within Türkiye and outside it-did not go unnoticed by Huseynzadeh.

3. New Political-Cultural Turkism

The third stage of Turkism in the new era, political-cultural Turkism, emerged on the eve of World War II and continued until the collapse of the Soviet Union. In fact, the fact that political Turkism was somewhat oriented towards a cultural direction was not accidental; the conditions of the era played an important role here. One of the authors and main propagandists of the new political-cultural Turkism was M.A. Rasulzadeh. Even before the establishment of the Republic of Azerbaijan (1917), Rasulzadeh, in addition to demanding separate national-territorial autonomy for the Turkic-Tatar nations within Russia, including the Azerbaijani Turks, proposed the formation of a National Council consisting of representatives of future autonomous Turkic states (Balayev, 2011, 61). Rasulzadeh, who developed this idea during the emigration period, recalled that during the Republic of Azerbaijan (1918-1920), the program of the “Musavat” party, adopted at its 2nd congress in Baku in 1919, stated in the introduction, “We believe that the vast Turkic world, which is scattered in its current state, will one day come together and form a united and friendly Turkic world, and we see the final destination of the path of action we have taken with this faith in the realization of such a connection” (Rasulzadeh, 2012/2, p. 74).

From this perspective, Rasulzadeh believed that the emergence of independent Turkic states did not overshadow the ideology of Turanism and Turkism; in other words, it did not break the Turkish-Turan unity: “Turanism and Turkism were the most durable bond, a tenacious thread that connected Türkiye and Azerbaijan in the literary profession. When the ideology of Turanism was born, the nation came up with the formulas of international Islamism and federation, and in sociology, it came up with a three-legged slogan such as “Turkishization, Islamization, and Modernization.” While the Istanbul yurts were spreading these slogans theoretically, the Azerbaijani Turanists accepted it as a political philosophy and declared it the principle of the national political party they founded” (Rasulzadeh, 1990, pp. 35-36).

According to the idea of new political-cultural Turanism, if it is not possible to unite all Muslims under the “Islamic unity,” only all Turks can create a federation among themselves to serve as an example of a great world federation: “New Turan, founded on cultural unity, can only be imagined as a federation of future Turkic governments. Azerbaijan is also an important link in this future Turan chain” (Rasulzadeh, 1990, p. 36). So, shortly after the April 27 occupation, M.A. Rasulzadeh defended the idea of a semi-political, semi-cultural “New Turan” in order to keep the Azerbaijani national idea alive. The idea of “New Turan” should be one of the main goals of all Turks living in Russian captivity, including Azerbaijani Turks, and according to Z. Gökalp, it should be aimed at Russia collapsing and being devastated and Türkiye growing and becoming Turan (Rasulzadeh, 1990, p. 37). Although these ideas of Ziya Gökalp and M.A. Rasulzadeh, that is, the possibility of Turan becoming a federation of Turkic governments, were somewhat romantic for that time, they also have convincing aspects in terms of the possibility of such a federation being formed together with other independent Turkic states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, etc.).

Undoubtedly, at that time, as now, these considerations of Turkist-Turanist thinkers could not be met unequivocally by ideologists of Russian, Armenian, and other nations. In this regard, in the 1920s-1930s, some foreign authors, including Hondkaryan, A. Kerensky, Mandelstam, Zarevands (Zaven Nalbandyan and Vartoui Nalbandyan), and others, wrote works about the danger of pan-Turanism and pan-Turkism (“In the service of Türkiye,” “Dictatorship over the Russian nation,” “Türkiye. Pan-Turanism”). In their opinion, the Pan-Turanists who wanted to destroy the USSR intended to create a Turanian empire. Researcher, Prof. Rafail Ahmadli rightly notes on this issue that “the ideology of Turkism, which emerged with the aim of

saving the Turkic peoples doomed to oppression from slavery, was described by the Turkish enemies as “pan-Turkism” and “pan-Turanism,” and attempts were made to prevent the Turks from having a say on the stage of history again” (Ahmadli, 2007, p. 195).

M.A. Rasulzadeh, in a number of articles at that time, including his most famous work on “pan-Turkism” and “pan-Turanism,” “Panturanism. The Caucasian Problem” (1930), wrote in response to the anti-Turkists that those who discuss this issue distort the history of Turkism and Turanism, as well as the ideas of the authors of these ideas. Thus, “pan-Turkism” and “pan-Turanism” were ideologies that emerged from within the people, unlike ideologies such as pan-Slavism. He wrote, “As for pan-Turkism, let us once and for all explain to the group that the misleaders who took advantage of the opportunity wanted to deceive them that, as in the Slavic nations, an ideology of unity was born in the nations of the Turkic race, and this birth, having experienced a romantic period for a certain time, had a more secular and progress-loving effect on the political Turkic-Tatar idea, which was until then in the habit of Islamic religious thinking. However, pan-Turanism, which had fewer real conditions and opportunities than pan-Slavism, came to the conclusion reached in a shorter time than pan-Slavism, and today the most ardent pan-Turanists are content with striving to preserve such a simple cultural unity as much as possible” (Rasulzadeh, 2009, pp. 50-51).

Thus, Rasulzadeh wanted to say that first, Turanism is an idea created by the nation itself, and second, although this idea was romantic in the early days, it has already given way to realistic, modern issues. In the modern era, the ideology of new Turkism or new Turanism is that there is not a single Turkish nation, but a single Turkish race. It is logical for each nation belonging to the Turkish race to create separate independent Turkish states. From this point of view, while “pan-Russianism” strives for the creation of a single “Slavic” state, the ideology of new Turanism advocates the creation of separate Turkish states. Taking this into account, Rasulzadeh writes: “Modern, realistic “Turkism”, which by its existence positively affects the national, natural trends of the Turkic peoples in the Soviet Union, is undoubtedly the oil of “pan-Russianism”” (Rasulzadeh, 2012/1, p. 27).

In his opinion, unlike the political Turkists of the early 20th century, modern Turkists do not live by the idea of a unified Turanian state. New Turkists do not strive to create a great empire of the Turks in the image of Türkiye-Ottoman, but for the separate independence of each Turkic people. From this point of view, just as the idea of Slavic unity did not prevent the formation of the Czechoslovak state, the idea of Turk-Turanian unity cannot prevent Azerbaijan from joining the Caucasian Confederation as an independent Turkic state. M.A. Rasulzadeh writes: “Those who, while preserving the common values in the Turkic countries, which have similar cultural products as a result of their proximity to the same race, question the movements of individual Turkic nations towards gaining independence as a separate state and republic can only be volunteers or slaves of Russian imperialism! While not denying that Azerbaijani independence is greatly influenced by the idea of Turkish unity, it is obvious that for Azerbaijani nationalists who are supporters of realism in politics, the acceptance of this idea in the field of culture will be applied simply” (Rasulzadeh, 2009, p. 52). He clearly stated that Azerbaijan has no intention of uniting with Türkiye under the name of the idea of pan-Turanism. Because political pan-Turanists who have moved to the field of cultural unity have already abandoned their position to the reality of Turkish nations (Rasulzadeh, 2009, p. 53).

M.A. Rasulzadeh wrote that, while it is clear that “pan-Turkism” and “pan-Turanism” do not have the same meaning as “new Turkism” and “new Turanism,» it is impossible to accept, in particular, the anti-Turkist and anti-Turanist propositions put forward by the “Zarevands” in their work “Türkiye. Pan-Turanism.” Thus, Mandelstam, who wrote the preface to the book of the “Zarevands”, deliberately falsified the history and essence of Turkism, trying to give it a completely different political color. For example, the “Zarevands” most often targeted the ideologists of Turkism, Z. Gökalp, Y. Akchura, as well as Atatürk, and accused them of pan-Turanism and pan-Turkism. According to the “Zarevands,” the idea of “pan-Turanism” was supposedly put forward by the ideologists of Turkism, Z. Gökalp, and the “Marx of the pan-Turanists,” Y. Akchura, while the “pan-Turanism” of our time is implemented by Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), because the main banner of the Kemalists is pan-Turkism, pan-Turanism (Zarevand, 1930, pp. 30-35).

Rasulzadeh first brought to the attention of anti-Turkist ideologists that although Z. Gökalp spoke about the ideology of Turanism, he called it a utopia like Lenin's communism (Gökalp, 1991, 38). Therefore, Gökalp's ideology of Turanism was more romantic, utopian in nature. In this sense, Atatürk's "pan-Turanism," which was based on Gökalp's ideas, does not differ much from it. Thus, Atatürk mentioned in his speeches during this period (1920-1930s) that the ideas of pan-Islamism and pan-Turanism had not achieved any success so far. According to Atatürk, the only real policy is national policy, in which sense "the aim of creating a state that would include all the Turks of the world is also an unrealizable idea" (Rasulzadeh, 2012/1, p. 40).

As a result of Atatürk's position on "pan-Turanism," some Turkish ideologists of that period (Kh. Müşkrim, etc.), unlike the first Turkists and Turanists, did not define the nation only by its ethnic and linguistic indicators but viewed it as a mutual product of separate historical, social, and cultural influences. They proposed a shift from "Turkish nationalism" to "Turkish nationalism," that is, to "Turkish internationalism." "The pioneers of this national system, led by the well-known historian Khalil bey Müşkrim, had also created a school called "Anatolians," which said that the concept of Turks was not a nation but a race. "Anatolians" say that there is not a single Turkish nation, but separate Turkish nations. Developing these ideas, they also proposed calling Türkiye Anatolia. According to them, the word "Anatolian" is more appropriate for national identity than the word "Turk" (Rasulzadeh, 2012/1, p. 19).

In our opinion, one of the main reasons for the cautious stance of Turkish intellectuals and leaders towards Turanism was that at that time the nations known as Turks, including the Turks of Türkiye, did not have any power on the world stage. Thus, the largest empire owned by the Turks-the Ottoman Empire-collapsed, and other Turkic states were occupied by Soviet Russia. In such a situation, it was natural for Z. Gökalp, M. A. Rasulzadeh, Atatürk, and other Turkish greats to accept Turanism more as a moral ideal-ideology. This was not their rejection of Turanism, but, as Atatürk also noted, they were pursuing a policy according to the requirements of the time and the strength of the Turkish nation. In this regard, we fully agree with the following views of the contemporary Turkish scholar A. Gökdemir that it is unreasonable that intellectuals such as Z. Gökalp, A. Hüseyinzadeh, A. Ağaoğlu, Y. Akchura, who pioneered and served Turkish nationalism and Turanism, do not make any demands regarding the Turkish lands outside the borders of Türkiye: "What is to be regretted here is not that the intellectuals are Turanists, but that Türkiye and the Turkic world are not strong enough and cannot win" (Gökdemir, 2005, p. 245).

In this regard, it is understandable that Rasulzadeh looked at Turanism from a new perspective in the 1920s-1930s, and in this sense distinguished between pan-Turanism, which is one of the national currents in the East, and chauvinist currents in the West. Because, according to Rasulzadeh, while chauvinism-nationalism in the West is a politically aggressive, socially restrictive ideology, nationalism in the East is a politically protective, socially innovative phenomenon (Rasulzadeh, 2012/1, 42). In other words, the Turkists, who were initially captivated by the romantic unity of Turan, now believe in the emergence of separate nations from the Turkic race and their own independent states. Rasulzadeh writes,

There is no longer a romantic, political pan-Turanism, but there is a Turkism that pursues the desires of the nation... The self-understanding of the Turkic peoples is shifting from the ideology of race to the ideology of the nation, which also eliminates aggression from an ideological-structural perspective. (Rasulzadeh, 2012/1, p. 62)

M.B. Mammadzadeh, along with the emergence and evolution of the idea of Azerbaijani Turkism, also tried to evaluate the existing ideas regarding the meaning of Turkism and Turanism for the Turkic peoples during the emigration period-political or cultural unity-and to express his position on this issue. He wrote that even on the eve of the collapse of Tsarist Russia, although Turkists and Turanists wanted to establish a unified Turkish state, they understood that this was impossible: "The geopolitical situation of the Turkic world, in terms of culture and culture, had pushed various Turkic peoples with the same ideology, goals, and tactics to the path of local patriotism in the political-state sphere" (Mammadzadeh, 1992, pp. 201-202).

M.B. Mammadzadeh believed that in this sense, romantic Turanism, like Turkism-Turkic unity, had completely changed its old meaning. He wrote that according to the “New Program Principles” adopted by “Musavat” in 1936, the issue of Turkism and Turanism consists of achieving an ideal unification of general Turkism and Azerbaijani Turkism. In other words, Musavatists, while remaining loyal and committed to the Turkish cultural unity, defend the idea of independent Azerbaijani Turkism: “Musavatism is Azerbaijani patriotism that is connected to the great Turkish culture, adopts national, cultural, and human values, and is committed to the ideals of freedom, republic, and independence. Due to the fact that Azerbaijan is a country belonging to the great Turkism, it is culturally connected to other Turkic countries. Musavatism seriously defends the preservation of this connection, as it was before and in the future” (Mammadzadeh, 1992, p. 2090).

4. Postmodern Political-Philosophical Turkism: Turkic Council-Organization of Turkic States

The increase in the number of independent Turkic states from one (Türkiye) to six (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) towards the end of the 20th century, and the fact that another State Formations also continued to struggle for independence, marked the beginning of a new stage. In particular, the emergence of five independent Turkic states from one to one with the collapse of the Soviet Union seriously concerned not only the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran but also some Western states.

Currently, in order to prevent the realization of Turkish unity, anti-Turkic circles continue to play various games in the Turkic states under the names of “Eurasianism,” Western democracy, “Islamic unity,” and other ideologies. Against the background of the slowdown in the process of forming national consciousness, alternative ideas and corresponding non-national forms of consciousness in the Turkic peoples influence different layers of society to one degree or another. Because people who do not have national consciousness at any level are inevitably either influenced by alternative ideas or themselves tend to foreign ideas. This is especially dangerous for young Turkic states that have regained their independence. In a society where national consciousness is not formed at a normal level, the very ideas that exist regarding foreign ideas are incomplete. These incompletenesses create an incompleteness complex in people’s public consciousness. It is not easy for a society whose national memory has been distorted for the next two centuries to turn to any model without solving this problem. First, the consciousness of national memory must be restored, and then an attempt must be made to implement some new model. If any model (“New Russian imperialism,” “Turkish Union,” “European Union,” etc.) is proposed to society without restoring the consciousness of national memory, different layers of society will react differently to it. Because the majority of society has not formed a unified national consciousness. This process is still ongoing. Due to a number of objective and subjective reasons, the formation of national consciousness and national identity in the Turkish states has been slow for a long time.

Therefore, the attitude towards the “new models” coming from Europe, the Islamic and Turkic worlds, and Russia is ambiguous. But among these models, Turkish unity, the European Union, and Eurasianism (“New Russian Imperialism”) attract Turkish societies the most. While Turkish unity is more in the interest of the young generation with a national spirit, and the European Union is in the interest of “liberal-free” Westerners, “New Russian Imperialism” retains its relevance for the older communist-minded “Soviet” generation. Although formally until yesterday, most of the “Soviet” generation, who spoke loudly about the independence of the Turkish states, do not hide their pro-Russian tendencies over time. This is a bitter truth: independence cannot be achieved through words and formalities. Independence and non-independence must be in the spirit and consciousness of the nation. Independence cannot be measured by duty or materiality. It is a matter of honor and dignity.

Our only salvation against the “New Russian Imperialism” and the “European Union” is Turkism, the idea of Turkish unity. The time has long come for Turkish unity to become a strategic goal. If Russia sees a strong and clearly defined Turkish Union in front of China, some Western states, and others, it will be forced to reckon with it. In any case, the Russian Federation cannot oppose a strong Turkish Union of China, the European Union, and others and even lay a hand on Türkiye, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, or Kyrgyzstan. Even if it decides to do so, it will have to take into account that it will have to face not one, but several Turkish states, and moreover, the Turkish autonomous republics within the Russian Federation may also change places. The Turkic-Turanian spirit is now on the rise not only in independent Turkic states but also in the Turkic autonomous republics within the Russian Federation (Tatarstan, Sakha, Kalmykia, Altai, etc.). The same process is also underway in China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and others.

According to E. Madatli and F. Gurbanov, from the first days of the Third Republic, Azerbaijani-Turkish relations began to revive:

As a result of Heydar Aliyev’s activities in the Third Republic, Azerbaijan, as an independent state, determined the foundations of a flexible, open to innovations, democratic synthesis of tradition and modernity. The process of independent state-building in Azerbaijan not only took place, but also the development paradigm was once and for all established here! Against the background of all this, Turkish-Azerbaijani relations have found and are still finding their confirmation as a very meaningful, interesting, and strategically important process”. (Madatli & Gurbanov, 2020, p. 126).

In their opinion, Heydar Aliyev’s “One Nation, Two States Formula” in the establishment of an independent state took on concrete content during his official visits to Türkiye in 1994, 1997, and 2001 as the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan (1993-2003): “These visits finalized the transition from the ‘One Nation, Two Empires’ formula to the ‘One Nation, Two Republics’ formula in terms of all aspects of state activity and gave it strategic content.” Without going into details, let us recall an idea expressed by the Great Leader during his speech at the ceremony of presenting the “State Badge” of the Republic of Türkiye on May 5, 1997. Heydar Aliyev declared at the ceremony, “I have said these words, and I repeat them again today: we are one people, two states. It is a great honor for the head of a state that is one people to receive the high award of another state”» (Madatli & Gurbanov, 2020, p. 144-145). Academician Isa Habibbayli believes that the political and literary factor was one of the main factors in the struggles of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in Türkiye and Heydar Aliyev in Azerbaijan for state independence and unity of the Turkic peoples (Habibbayli, 2013, 48). The phrase “one nation, two states,” spoken by the great leader Heydar Aliyev about the nature of the unity of Türkiye and Azerbaijan, confirms the unbreakable bonds between these two brotherly peoples. The centuries-old brotherhood and friendly relations between Türkiye and Azerbaijan are the guarantee of peace and security in the modern geopolitical situation (Mammadzadeh & Bunyatov, 2023, p. 179).

E. Madatli and F. Gurbanov show that after Heydar Aliyev, President Ilham Aliyev successfully conducted and continues to conduct Azerbaijani-Turkish relations within the framework of the “One nation, two states” concept. They write, “Ilham Aliyev, as the full political successor of the great leader Heydar Aliyev, first as Prime Minister and then as President of Azerbaijan, has taken steps in all directions, including in line with the spirit, content, and purpose of the “One Nation, Two States” formula, and this continues. On this path, the head of state, without any hesitation, has implemented a policy that serves the independent development of the two brotherly states, the strengthening of society, and the constant increase in mutually beneficial cooperation under all conditions. In order to achieve practical success, President Ilham Aliyev should have enriched the “One Nation, Two States” formula in theoretical and ideological aspects, organically included it in a political course that allows for flexible adaptation in a rapidly changing global environment, and dynamically increased its influence. This is a very important point from a philosophical point of view. Experience shows that Ilham Aliyev has coped with this task at a high level and will continue to do so” (Madatli & Gurbanov, 2020, p. 167).

It is true that İlham Aliyev holds an indispensable place among the heads of Turkish states who work the most for the unity of the World Azerbaijanis (Aliyev, 2014, p. 20) and for the unity of Turks. On March 9, 2007, in his historic speech at the First Forum of the Heads of the World Azerbaijani and Turkish Diaspora Organizations, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan İlham Aliyev emphasized,

Perhaps there are no other countries in the world that are so closely connected to each other. Both in terms of the ethnic affiliation of the peoples, and in terms of political views, and in terms of common interests. We must make our unity even stronger and more comprehensive. Of course, the activity of our compatriots living abroad is also very important in these matters. (Aliyev, 2015, p. 57)

After Azerbaijan and the Central Asian Turkic states gained independence, relations with Türkiye were immediately established-Türkiye was the first country to recognize our state independence. Since then, we have felt Türkiye's strong fraternal support. Türkiye, which has become even stronger in recent years, also adds strength to the strength of its brothers. The Second Karabakh War, from September 27 to November 10, 2020, demonstrated to the whole world how important Türkiye's support is. Of course, it was natural for Türkiye, which we accepted as one nation (TURK) and two states (Azerbaijan + Türkiye) in the Patriotic War, to be with us: Azerbaijan means Türkiye, Türkiye means Azerbaijan! No force could change this fact! From the first day of the war to the last day, Türkiye was the first to unequivocally support Azerbaijan. In all his speeches, the Head of State of the Republic of Türkiye, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has repeatedly stated that they provide all kinds of political and moral support to Azerbaijan, and even that Azerbaijan is ready to provide military support if necessary. At the same time, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye, Mevlut Cavusoglu, visited Azerbaijan several times during the 44-day Patriotic War and met with the President of Azerbaijan, İlham Aliyev. This showed that Türkiye, which provides political and moral support to Azerbaijan at the highest level, is equally interested and eager to liberate Karabakh from occupation as we are.

E. Madatli and F. Gurbanov write that since the large-scale military operations launched by the aggressor Armenia against our country on September 27, 2020 in order to seize new territories prompted the Azerbaijani people to rise up against the enemy in a great Patriotic war, the Republic of Türkiye once again demonstrated its loyalty to the formula "One nation, two states" by standing by Azerbaijan in all related issues. The authors write:

The Republic of Türkiye and the brotherly Turkish people have set a real example of how citizens who have separate states can speak out on the stage of history as a single nation in good times and bad times. The Turkish people, led by President R. T. Erdoğan, all their political parties and institutions, and other state and public organizations have expressed their support for Azerbaijan in this just war. They have expressed their readiness to help Azerbaijan in any way they want. (Madatli & Gurbanov, 2020, p. 213).

The Shusha Declaration, signed between Azerbaijan and Türkiye in Shusha, shortly after the 44-day Patriotic War in June 2021, played a very important role in the unity of both states entering a new stage. This step by both Turkish states, which had already strengthened their political, economic, and cultural unity in military terms, was also a very essential event for Turkish unity. It is precisely with the entry of Azerbaijan and Türkiye into a new stage that relations between the Turkic states have become even closer and more intense.

It can be said with certainty that in the formation of the pan-Turkic fanaticism of the Turkic republics united in the Turkic Council today and in the future development dynamics, the philosophy of the great leader Heydar Aliyev, "One nation, two states," will gradually become the foundation and principle of common morality. (Madatli & Gurbanov, 2020, p. 214)

It is as a result of this that at the VIII Summit of the Cooperation Council of Turkic States held in Istanbul on November 12, 2021, a decision was made to change the name of the Cooperation Council of Turkic States to the "Organization of Turkic States." This was not only a name change but also an indicator of a new vision and a new development vector.

It should be noted that while the Turkic States Organization had four member countries when it was established-Azerbaijan, Türkiye, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan-today the organization already has five members and three observer countries. Thus, while Uzbekistan became a member of the TSO in 2019, Turkmenistan, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, and Hungary have observer status. Hungary's accession to this organization, as well as the desire of dozens of other countries to obtain observer status, reveals the weight and perspective of the TSO. There are also a number of bodies and organizations affiliated with the Turkic States Organization. Of these, the Secretariat of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Turkic States (TURKPA) and the Secretariat of the Turkic Culture and Heritage Foundation are located in Azerbaijan. The International Turkic Academy operates in Kazakhstan.

In the modern stage, the transition of other Turkic peoples, especially autonomous Turkic peoples within the Russian Federation, to the Latin script will be accelerated to one degree or another on the path to a common Turkic alphabet, and the common Turkic alphabet will be further improved. At the same time, in the second stage, the Turkish Runic alphabet can also be used to improve the common Turkic alphabet. The member countries of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) are also seriously trying to solve the problem of creating a single alphabet. In this regard, at an event held by the OTS in Bursa in the fall of 2022, scientists from the member states of the organization provided information about the alphabet and historical language processes taking place in their countries and created a "Common Alphabet Commission" in order to accelerate the transition to a single alphabet.

The strengthening of the Turkic states and the development of cooperation within the framework of the Organization of Turkic States are irritating a number of foreign forces. Against this background, we are currently observing an increase in Turkophobia in some countries of the world. The most obvious example of this is the Turkophobia prevailing in the countries called Armenia and Iran. The territories inhabited by Azerbaijanis in the country called Iran are also perceived as an integral part of the Turkic world. By the way, in this regard, during a meeting with the Secretary General of the TDT, Bagdad Amreyev, on October 21, 2022, while he was on a visit to Baku, President Ilham Aliyev stated that the Turkic world does not consist only of Turkic states and that the rights and security of people of Turkish origin living outside the Turkic states must be protected. President Ilham Aliyev emphasized that the rights and freedoms of our compatriots living outside Azerbaijan are of great importance for our country.

At the ninth summit held in Samarkand in November 2022, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev openly declared that strengthening relations with the member countries of the Organization of Turkic States in all areas is one of the main priorities of Azerbaijan's foreign policy: "Azerbaijan has always contributed to the close unity of the Turkic world and will continue to remain committed to the goals of the unity of the Turkic world. Starting from the Nakhchivan Summit in 2009, our organization has come a long way in development. The Turkic world covers a vast geography inhabited by more than 200 million people and has great economic potential, energy resources, transport routes, and modern military capabilities. The Turkic world is a big family. We must continue to show mutual support and solidarity, taking into account each other's national interests" (Alakbarli, 2024, p.9-10)

It should be noted that the victory of the Republican Alliance, led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, in both the parliamentary and presidential elections held in Türkiye in May 2023 is seen positively in terms of the present and future of the Organization of Turkic States. This unity also manifested itself in the inauguration ceremony held at the "Küllüye," that is, the Presidential Palace, in Ankara on June 3, 2023, on the occasion of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's re-election as president. At that inauguration ceremony, R.T. Erdoğan paid close attention to the heads of the Turkic States, including the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev, the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev, the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart-Tokayev, the President of the TRNC Ersin Tatar, and others. In particular, the value that R.T. Erdoğan gave to the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, was met with great applause by the participants of the ceremony. In general, the inauguration ceremony of R.T. Erdoğan in Ankara was

a demonstration of the emergence of the Organization of Turkic States, that is, the Turkic unity, as a new power in the world. It can be said that most political scientists and political commentators initially assessed this ceremony as a “Turkish wedding.”

After winning the snap presidential elections held on February 7, 2024, President Ilham Aliyev once again declared at the inauguration ceremony held in the Milli Majlis that Azerbaijan will continue its efforts within the framework of the Organization of Turkic States among international organizations, first of all, and this is a priority for Azerbaijan. According to the head of state, the main reason for this is that Azerbaijan has one family in the world, which is the Turkic world: “This is the main international organization for us, because this is our family. We have no other family. Our family is the Turkic world” (Alakbarli, 2024, pp. 9-10). One of the main goals set by President Ilham Aliyev is that the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) should become a “significant actor and center of power» on a global level (Mammadzadeh et al., 2024, p. 220).

Recently, one of the Central Asian countries that intends to take serious steps towards Turkic unity is Uzbekistan. The Turkic-spirited statements of the President of Uzbekistan, Shavkat Mirzoyev, show that it is realistic for the Organization of Turkic States to become one of the world’s power centers. It is simply important that certain Turkic-spirited reforms take place in other Turkic countries, as in Uzbekistan. It is time for the Turks to speak out as one of the largest nations in the world with rich experience for thousands of years. History shows us that when the Turks dominated the world, justice and order prevailed. Of course, there may be certain exceptions where there was war, but in general, the culture and justice of the Turks are known to all the peoples of the world. In addition to Turkmenistan, Hungary is also among the countries that tend towards Turkic unity. This means that not only Muslim Turkic states, but also Christian and other faith Turkic states can join the Turkic union that will be established in the near future.

Conclusion

According to the conclusion we reached after the research we conducted on the subject of Turkish unity, there has been serious progress in recent years towards the realization of the idea of Turkish unity. The idea of jointly building the future is increasing due to the closer acquaintance of the Turkish peoples with each other and the return to common roots. At the same time, the holding of conferences and symposiums attended by Turkish scientists, the development of technology, and especially the strengthening of political, economic, cultural and military cooperation between the Turkic states have played an important role in this direction. As for the creation of Turkish unity, there is very little left to come to a common conclusion from various different ideas towards the realization of this idea. In other words, we Turks have come a long way towards the creation of a single political union of the existing independent and semi-independent Turkic states.

Also, on the path to Turkish unity, the self-confidence of the Turkish people has begun to be restored. Our rebirth as the Turkic peoples is in sight. In our opinion, this national revival manifested itself more seriously after the 44-day 2nd Karabakh war between Azerbaijan and Armenia. This war awakened not only the Azerbaijani Turks, but also all the Turkic peoples, giving them a new breath.

It is true that until recent years, what happened against the backdrop of the slogan of the 21st century being the “Turkish century” was not at all encouraging, and the issue of realizing Turkish unity has somewhat faded into the background. In particular, the continuation of the process of Turkification by anti-Turkic circles in Türkiye, Azerbaijan and Turkestan, which are the main centers of Turkism and Turkish unity, has led to some problems. That is why, even though the idea of Turkish unity has been voiced so many times at the highest level - from the lips of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev, the President of the Republic of Türkiye Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and the elder of the Turkic world Nursultan Nazarbayev, there have been those within the Turkic states who have ignored it and ignored it. Therefore, we believe that until recently, there were serious obstacles to the 21st century becoming the “Turkish century”. However, as a result of the practical policy pursued by the brotherly Turkic peoples and their heads of state

in the Turkic Council, the Cooperation Council of Turkic States, TURKSOY, Turkish Culture, Turkish Academy, the Organization of Turkic States, the Turkish Investment Fund and other areas, those who held an unhealthy position in relation to Turkism were forced to retreat and a new stage has already been started (Mammadzadeh et al., 2023, pp. 344-345).

The main method in relation to the Turkic unity is to be based on the philosophy of the Turkic peoples, the Turkic states and to show the essence of the creation of the Organization of Turkic States. The main method here is to proceed from the political-ideological philosophy of the Turkic Union on the one hand, and to show sensitivity to foreign methods directed against it on the other. Our main scientific innovation here is to express the uniqueness of the philosophy of the Turkic Union in a historical-philosophical and contemporary sense. At the same time, one of the main scientific innovations here is the assessment of the sources of the history of the Turkic unity and the importance of the transformation of the Organization of Turkic States into one of the new centers of power in the world. It is to reveal the importance of the existence of the Turkic Unity and its clear example, the Organization of Turkic States, for the present and future of humanity.

References

- Akchura, Y. (2010). *History of Turkism*. Qanun Publishing House
- Ayvazov, H. S. (2006). Why did we end up in this situation?. *Füyuzat (1906-1907)*. Chasioğlu
- Ağaoğlu, A. (2019). *National issue in the Caucasus*. Translated
- Ağaoğlu A. (1912). Turkic world. Islam and Turkism. Istanbul. "Turkish homeland", 7(13), 196-210
- Balayev, A. (2011). *Mammad Emin Rasulzadeh (1884-1955)*. Chirag
- Aliyev, I. H. (2014). *Development is our goal*. Book 16. Azernashr
- Aliyev, I. H. (2015). *Development is our goal*. Book 23. Azernashr
- Alakbarli, F.G. (2024). *History of Azerbaijani Turkish philosophical and social thought (XIX-XX centuries)*. In three volumes, volume II (Second book). Science and Education
- Ahmedli, R. (2007). *The ideology of Azerbaijani national-democratic statehood: Turkism, modernity, Islamism*. Science Publishing House
- Gökalp, Z. (1991). *The foundations of Turkism*. Maarif
- Gökdemir, A. (2005). *Portraits from our history of thought*. Bayrak Publishing House
- Gaspıralı, I. (2001). *Turkestan scholars*. Ornek
- Gaspıralı, I. (2002). *Unity in language, thought, work*. Qartal Publishing House
- Habibbeyli, I. (2013). *Heydar Aliyev's statehood doctrine and the modern era*. Ajami
- Huseynzadeh, A.B. (2007). *Selected works*. East-West Publishing House
- Huseynzadeh, A. B. (1997). *Who are the Turks and who do they consist of?* Translated
- Huseynzadeh, A. B. (2008). *Selected works*. Two volumes. Volume II. Chasioğlu
- Mammadzadeh, M.B. (1992). *National Azerbaijani movement*. Nicat Publishing House
- Mammadzadeh, İ., Bunyatov, A. (2023). *Epistemological characteristics of nationality and national self-awareness in the context of fuzzy logic*. Science and Education
- Mammadzadeh, I., Madatli, E., Gurbanov, F., Hasanov, S., Huseyov, H., Zulfugarov, V. (2024). *Ilham Aliyev: Conceptual aspects and philosophy of the national idea in the new era*. Bakhtiyar-4
- Mammadzadeh, I., Madatli, E., Gurbanov, F., Hasanov, S., Huseyov, H., Zulfugarov, V. (2023). *Heydar Aliyev – Ilham Aliyev: Leadership philosophy and statehood experience of modern Azerbaijan*. Science and Education
- Madatli, E., & Gurbanov F. (2020). "One nation, two states": *philosophical and historical analysis*. Science and education
- Rasulzadeh, M.A. (2012/1). *Pan-Turanism. The Caucasian problem*. Teknur
- Rasulzadeh, M.A. (2012/2). *Caucasian Turks*. Teknur
- Rasulzadeh, M.A. (1990). *Siyavushu of our century, Contemporary Azerbaijani literature, Contemporary Azerbaijani history*. Ganjlik
- Rasulzadeh, M.A. (2009). *National unity*. Chirag
- Rustamov, I. (2012). *Hasan bey Zardabi*. Turan Publishing House
- Zarevand (Zaven, N., Vartoui, N.). (1930). *Türkiye and Pan-Turanism*. Rodnik
- Zardabi, H. (2007). Language and religion. *Anthology of Azerbaijani journalism*, (pp.21-26). East-West Publishing House
- Zardabi, H. (2007). Language unity. *Anthology of Azerbaijani journalism*, (pp.14-21). East-West Publishing House

About the Author

Faig Gazanfaroglu Alakbarli

Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, National Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan | faikalekperov[at]mail.ru | ORCID: 0000-0002-8865-568X

Faig Gazanfar oglu Alakbarli was born on April 12, 1977 in the village of Dayirmandagh, Gadabay region. In 1994-1998, he studied at the Faculty of Social Sciences and Psychology of Baku State University named after M.A. Rasulzadeh, where he received a bachelor's and master's degree in philosophy. In 2001-2004, he was a postgraduate student at the Institute of Philosophy and Law of ANAS. In 2005, he defended his dissertation on the topic "The place and role of Mahammad Amin Rasulzadeh in the history of socio-political and philosophical thought of Azerbaijan in the 20th century" and received the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in philosophy. In 2013, he was awarded the title of associate professor (assistant professor) by the AAK. Currently, he is the head of the Department of History of Philosophical Thought and Modern Philosophy of the Turkic Peoples of the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of ANAS. Since 2003, he has been working as a teacher at a number of universities (ADPU, BSU, AESMA, AKU, etc.). He is the author of ten books-monographs (five of them co-authored) and more than 270 scientific articles, some of which have been published in Turkey, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.