

Citation List: Şan Akca, B., & Yılmaz, Ş. (2026). Energy security and strategic realignment: Azerbaijan-Türkiye cooperation in an era of global uncertainty. In Ş. Aktürk & A. Balcı (Eds.), *Azerbaijan and Türkiye in world politics* (pp. 245-256). Turkish Academy of Sciences Publications.

CHAPTER 16

ENERGY SECURITY AND STRATEGIC REALIGNMENT: AZERBAIJAN-TÜRKİYE COOPERATION IN AN ERA OF GLOBAL UNCERTAINTY

**Belgin ŞAN AKCA
Şahnaz YILMAZ**

ENERGY SECURITY AND STRATEGIC REALIGNMENT: AZERBAIJAN–TÜRKİYE COOPERATION IN AN ERA OF GLOBAL UNCERTAINTY

Belgin ŞAN AKCA

Koç University

Şuhnaz YILMAZ

Koç University

Abstract

The evolving uncertainty in the global order presents significant challenges for mid-sized powers trying to navigate major power competition. The recent geopolitical crises, such as Russia's invasion of Ukraine and US sanctions, has elevated energy security to a core issue of national security. The evolving energy partnership between Azerbaijan and Türkiye, on the other hand, is a significant example of how energy can play a role for regional diplomacy rather than conflict escalation. Both countries chose strategic realignment in response to shifting U.S.–Russia relations, European energy diversification efforts, and regional security transformations. Our paper examines the role of energy security as both a driver and an outcome of deepening Azerbaijan–Türkiye ties in an era of global uncertainty. We argue that the deepening cooperation between Azerbaijan and Türkiye, specifically in large-scale infrastructure projects such as TANAP and the Southern Gas Corridor, has not only strengthened bilateral ties but has also positioned both states as critical actors in the global energy architecture. Türkiye's ambition to become a regional energy hub overlaps with Azerbaijan's role as a reliable supplier. This helps creating a functional interdependence that reshapes regional power dynamics. In this chapter, we examine how pipeline diplomacy allows Azerbaijan and Türkiye to exercise influence beyond their immediate neighborhoods, shaping relations with the EU, NATO, and alternative regional blocs like the Organization of Turkic States. Moreover, the paper explores how these energy linkages serve as a buffer against external shocks, such as sanctions, supply disruptions, or military tensions. By placing energy cooperation at the heart of Türkiye–Azerbaijan relations, we shed light on how energy cooperation is not used merely for economic gain, but as tools of strategic positioning in a volatile international system. Our findings speak to broader debates on energy security, regional resilience, and the agency of non-hegemonic powers in shaping global governance.

Keywords

Energy Security, Energy Cooperation, Network Analysis, Energy Interdependence, Balancing

Introduction

The international system is undergoing a profound transformation marked by shifting power relations, growing systemic volatility, and renewed great power competition. The relative decline of U.S. hegemony, the reassertion of Russian and Chinese influence, and the rise of regional powers have collectively unsettled the post–Cold War order that once promised stability and liberal integration. The resulting environment is increasingly characterized by multipolarity, strategic ambiguity, and the erosion of traditional alliances. These trends complicate the foreign policy choices of mid-sized states, which must balance strategic autonomy with the need for adaptability in a fluid geopolitical landscape (Acharya, 2014; Buzan, 2021; Walt, 2018).

Amid this global realignment, energy security has emerged as a central concern leading to both inter-state competition and cooperation. The convergence of geopolitical rivalry, climate change imperatives, and technological shifts has redefined the global energy agenda. The urgency of the energy transition, which is driven by commitments to decarbonization and the consequences of global warming, has intersected with traditional concerns over supply security, diversification, and affordability (Goldthau & Keating, 2018; Yergin, 2020). Energy, once viewed primarily as a technical and economic issue, has reemerged as a strategic instrument in foreign policy and national security planning.

The stakes of energy politics became particularly evident after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which disrupted long-standing energy supply chains and triggered extensive Western sanctions. Europe’s dependence on Russian natural gas exposed vulnerabilities that transformed energy diversification from a policy preference into a strategic imperative. This crisis accelerated the search for alternative suppliers, routes, and hubs across Eurasia and the Eastern Mediterranean (Colgan, 2023; International Energy Agency, 2022).

In this volatile environment, energy has become both a tool of leverage and a mechanism of diplomacy. “Pipeline diplomacy” has evolved as a key means by which states project influence, secure alliances, and manage regional dependencies (Roberts, 2018; Shaffer, 2009). Through transnational infrastructure such as pipelines and interconnectors, states develop economic and strategic linkages that mitigate conflict while enhancing bargaining power in a multipolar order (Keohane & Nye, 1977; Kirchner & Berk, 2018). For mid-sized powers, these energy linkages offer not only economic benefits but also geopolitical agency, allowing them to navigate between rival blocs and maintain strategic relevance.

Within this broader context, Türkiye and Azerbaijan have emerged as a compelling case of regional cooperation shaped by energy interdependence. Their partnership reflects not merely shared cultural and historical affinities but also a deliberate strategy to transform energy cooperation into a platform for geopolitical influence. As subsequent sections will show, the evolution of Azerbaijan’s energy sector, from its oil wealth to its expanding natural gas exports, has been pivotal in shaping the contours of its relationship with Türkiye. Together, the two states have leveraged large-scale projects such as TANAP and the Southern Gas Corridor to reposition themselves as central actors in Europe’s evolving energy landscape and as stabilizing forces in an uncertain regional order.

1. Türkiye–Azerbaijan Relations in a Changing Geopolitical Landscape

Against the backdrop of systemic uncertainty, Türkiye and Azerbaijan have emerged as regional actors that successfully leverage energy cooperation to pursue both economic and strategic objectives. Their partnership illustrates how mid-sized powers can translate *functional interdependence* into geopolitical influence in a multipolar environment. The deepening alignment between the two countries represents not only a response to regional security transformations but also a broader effort to secure strategic autonomy amid shifting great power rivalries (Acharya, 2014; Walt, 2018).

Türkiye's position at the crossroads of Europe, the Middle East, and the Caucasus has long rendered it a pivotal transit and balancing actor in Eurasian geopolitics. Historically, Ankara's foreign policy has oscillated between Western alignment through NATO and pragmatic diversification toward Russia, the Middle East, and Central Asia (Roberts, 2018; Yergin, 2020). In parallel, Azerbaijan, endowed with significant hydrocarbon resources, has navigated a delicate equilibrium between asserting its sovereignty and maintaining constructive ties with both Russia and Western partners. The two states' converging strategic trajectories have produced a cooperative framework that combines shared identity with material interdependence.

While Türkiye and Azerbaijan share deep linguistic, cultural, and historical bonds, often expressed through the phrase "one nation, two states", their modern alliance has been consolidated through energy cooperation. The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline, inaugurated in 2006, established a foundational corridor linking the Caspian basin to Mediterranean markets without transiting Russian or Iranian territory. This project was followed by the Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum (BTE) gas pipeline and later by the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP), both of which significantly enhanced the strategic depth of bilateral relations. These projects not only diversified export routes for Azerbaijani hydrocarbons but also advanced Türkiye's ambition to become an energy hub connecting producers in the Caspian and Middle East with European consumers (Colgan, 2023; Shaffer, 2009).

Energy cooperation has thus served as a central pillar of what might be termed *pipeline diplomacy* between the two states. The construction of large-scale transnational infrastructure has created tangible linkages that reinforce political alignment, mutual dependence, and regional leverage. Through projects such as TANAP and the Southern Gas Corridor, Türkiye and Azerbaijan have expanded their influence beyond the South Caucasus, shaping Europe's energy diversification strategy and the broader Eurasian balance of power (Kirchner & Berk, 2018; Roberts, 2018).

Moreover, this cooperation has evolved in parallel with major geopolitical developments. Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent energy crisis in Europe have further underscored the strategic value of the Türkiye–Azerbaijan partnership. As European states accelerated efforts to reduce reliance on Russian gas, Azerbaijan's exports via the Southern Gas Corridor gained renewed significance. Türkiye's role as a transit and trading hub has positioned it as a critical intermediary in managing regional energy flows and mitigating systemic shocks (International Energy Agency, 2022; Yergin, 2020).

Beyond energy, the partnership has extended into defense cooperation, joint military exercises, and political coordination through regional organizations such as the Organization of Turkic States. These dimensions illustrate how energy interdependence can spill over into broader strategic domains, fostering resilience and enhancing regional agency. For both Türkiye and Azerbaijan, this partnership represents not merely an alignment of convenience but a deliberate strategy to navigate a world defined by fluid alliances and contested orders.

The following section traces the evolution of Azerbaijan's energy trajectory, from its historical reliance on oil to its expanding role in the natural gas market, and explores how this transformation laid the foundation for its deepening cooperation with Türkiye.

2. Azerbaijan's Energy Trajectories: From Oil Wealth to Gas Diplomacy

Azerbaijan's modern statehood and economic development are deeply intertwined with its energy endowments. Historically one of the world's earliest oil-producing regions, Azerbaijan played a pivotal role in fueling the industrial growth of the Russian Empire and, later, the Soviet Union. The city of Baku emerged as a global oil capital in the late nineteenth century, home to pioneering extraction and refining technologies that attracted both Western and Russian investors. During the Soviet period, the energy sector was tightly integrated into the centralized command economy, with production and export routes designed to serve Moscow's strategic priorities rather than Baku's national interests (Shaffer, 2009; Yergin, 2020).

Following independence in 1991, Azerbaijan faced the dual challenge of rebuilding its post-Soviet economy and redefining its geopolitical orientation. Energy quickly became the central pillar of this transformation. The signing of the “Contract of the Century” in 1994 marked a turning point: a consortium of Western oil companies, led by BP, entered into production-sharing agreements (PSAs) to develop offshore fields in the Caspian Sea. This agreement not only revitalized Azerbaijan’s energy industry but also symbolized its westward geopolitical reorientation. The revenues generated from these contracts provided the foundation for economic stabilization and the accumulation of sovereign wealth through the State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ), established in 1999 to manage hydrocarbon income and promote long-term fiscal sustainability (Colgan, 2023; International Energy Agency, 2022).

The early 2000s witnessed the construction of major export infrastructure that redefined Azerbaijan’s position within global energy markets. The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline, operational in 2006, connected Caspian resources to the Mediterranean, bypassing both Russian and Iranian territory. This was followed by the Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum (BTE) natural gas pipeline in 2007, which expanded Azerbaijan’s export capacity and reinforced its role as a reliable supplier to European and Turkish markets. Together, these projects enabled Azerbaijan to exercise what can be described as *energy diplomacy*: the use of resource flows and infrastructure to gain political leverage, attract foreign investment, and anchor strategic partnerships (Kirchner & Berk, 2018; Roberts, 2018).

As the global energy landscape evolved, Azerbaijan adapted its strategy to new market and geopolitical realities. The discovery and development of the Shah Deniz gas field transformed Azerbaijan from a primarily oil-based economy into a significant natural gas exporter. The launch of the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) in 2018 and the subsequent completion of the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) in 2020 extended Azerbaijani gas supplies into southern and western Europe, creating what the European Commission labeled the “Southern Gas Corridor.” This corridor not only diversified Europe’s energy sources but also entrenched Azerbaijan’s role as a strategic bridge between the Caspian and European energy systems (International Energy Agency, 2022; Yergin, 2020).

The maturation of Azerbaijan’s gas diplomacy coincided with growing European concerns over energy security, especially following recurrent gas disputes between Russia and Ukraine in the 2000s and, more dramatically, after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Azerbaijan’s ability to deliver stable gas supplies through TANAP and TAP enhanced its status as a dependable partner for European diversification efforts. This new phase of energy diplomacy has elevated Baku’s regional influence and created opportunities for synergistic cooperation with Türkiye, whose own ambitions to become an energy hub align closely with Azerbaijan’s export and transit objectives.

Thus, Azerbaijan’s trajectory from oil wealth to gas diplomacy represents not only an economic transformation but also a strategic repositioning within the broader Eurasian power structure. By coupling its hydrocarbon endowments with institutional reforms and transnational infrastructure, Azerbaijan has transformed energy into both a foreign policy instrument and a source of national resilience. The next section explores how this evolution has intersected with Türkiye’s regional strategy, leading to an enduring partnership centered on energy interdependence and geopolitical alignment.

3. The Evolution of Türkiye–Azerbaijan Energy Cooperation

The energy relationship between Türkiye and Azerbaijan has evolved from a set of pragmatic infrastructure initiatives into a cornerstone of regional geopolitics. What began as an effort to transport Azerbaijani hydrocarbons to global markets has matured into a multidimensional partnership encompassing trade, security, and regional diplomacy. This evolution reflects both structural imperatives—Europe’s growing demand for diversified energy routes—and strategic choices made by Ankara and Baku to align their long-term interests in a volatile international environment (Colgan, 2023; Roberts, 2018).

The first phase of cooperation was defined by oil. The construction of the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, completed in 2006, was a landmark achievement that demonstrated the two countries' ability to coordinate major infrastructure projects independent of Russian control. BTC established a secure westward corridor connecting the Caspian basin to the Mediterranean, symbolizing Azerbaijan's integration into global markets and Türkiye's emergence as a vital energy transit state. For Türkiye, BTC served as a prototype for its broader strategy to transform geographic centrality into geopolitical capital; for Azerbaijan, it represented sovereignty and autonomy in foreign policy decision-making (Shaffer, 2009; Yergin, 2020).

The second phase, centered on natural gas, deepened this cooperation and expanded its strategic scope. The Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum (BTE) pipeline, inaugurated in 2007, laid the groundwork for the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP), launched in 2018 as the backbone of the Southern Gas Corridor. TANAP connects the Shah Deniz II field in the Caspian Sea to European consumers through Türkiye, linking with the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) at the Greek border. These projects collectively represent one of the most ambitious energy infrastructure undertakings in Eurasia, integrating upstream production, midstream transit, and downstream delivery within a coherent strategic framework (BP, 2023; International Energy Agency, 2022).

Through TANAP and TAP, Türkiye and Azerbaijan have achieved what can be described as *functional interdependence*: a mutually reinforcing relationship in which both economic and political gains are derived from shared energy infrastructure. Türkiye's ambition to become a regional energy hub, a marketplace rather than a mere transit corridor, aligns with Azerbaijan's goal of expanding its export routes and reducing exposure to external shocks. This interdependence enhances their bargaining power vis-a-vis external actors, including Russia, the European Union, and Iran, while anchoring their bilateral cooperation in material and institutional foundations (Kirchner & Berk, 2018; Roberts, 2018).

Beyond the economic dimension, energy cooperation has reinforced political and security alignment. Joint ventures in pipeline management, cross-border energy investments, and shared financing mechanisms have deepened institutional trust. Parallel to this, the two states have intensified defense collaboration through joint military exercises, arms sales, and intelligence cooperation, particularly following the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In this sense, pipeline diplomacy has produced not only economic dividends but also strategic cohesion, as energy infrastructure becomes both a symbol and a tool of regional order-making (Buzan, 2021; Yergin, 2020).

The Türkiye–Azerbaijan partnership thus exemplifies how mid-sized powers can leverage energy cooperation to navigate great power rivalry and enhance regional influence. By coupling hard infrastructure with soft power instruments, cultural diplomacy, institutional coordination, and multilateral initiatives such as the Organization of Turkic States, Ankara and Baku have expanded their geopolitical agency. As Europe continues its search for reliable energy partners and global energy markets remain in flux, the Türkiye–Azerbaijan model stands as a case of how energy interdependence can serve as both a stabilizing force and a strategic asset in a turbulent world order.

4. Energy Interdependence and Regional Power Balancing

Energy interdependence between Türkiye and Azerbaijan has evolved into a defining feature of their regional strategy and a key determinant of the balance of power in Eurasia. Unlike asymmetric dependencies that often characterize producer–consumer relations, the Türkiye–Azerbaijan partnership is marked by mutual gains and relatively balanced vulnerability. This equilibrium enables both states to enhance their strategic autonomy vis-a-vis larger powers while cultivating regional stability through cooperative mechanisms (Keohane & Nye, 1977; Kirchner & Berk, 2018).

Beijing while deepening cooperation with Western markets and institutions (Colgan, 2023; International Energy Agency, 2022). Energy revenues have also underpinned domestic stability, financed large-scale infrastructure projects and bolstering Azerbaijan's post-conflict reconstruction and defense capabilities following the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war.

The Türkiye–Azerbaijan partnership demonstrates that energy interdependence can function as a stabilizing mechanism in a volatile multipolar environment. Rather than generating competition or dependency traps, shared energy infrastructure fosters institutionalized cooperation and mutual deterrence against external coercion. This reflects the broader logic of *complex interdependence* (Keohane & Nye, 1977): where multiple channels of interaction, economic, political, and societal, constrain unilateral action and encourage negotiated outcomes. In this sense, pipeline diplomacy operates not only as an economic project but also as a strategic hedge against systemic uncertainty.

At the same time, energy interdependence contributes to an evolving regional balance of power in which mid-sized states exercise agency through connectivity rather than confrontation. Türkiye and Azerbaijan utilize energy cooperation as a tool of soft balancing, strengthening regional linkages, diversifying partnerships, and shaping the institutional landscape without directly challenging dominant powers. Their coordination through the Organization of Turkic States and related platforms reflects an effort to institutionalize these linkages and project influence across Central Asia and the Caucasus. By embedding their bilateral relationship within wider regional frameworks, both states amplify their collective voice in global governance and contribute to a more pluralistic energy order.

In sum, the Türkiye–Azerbaijan case underscores how energy interdependence can serve as both an instrument of national resilience and a vector of regional transformation. In an era of systemic volatility and shifting alignments, their partnership highlights the capacity of mid-sized powers to adapt, cooperate, and exert influence through functional connectivity rather than coercive means. As the following sections will demonstrate, this model of energy-based cooperation offers broader insights into how states navigate the intersection of energy security, strategic autonomy, and regional diplomacy in the twenty-first century.

5. Energy as Consolidator of Cooperation: Turkish-Azerbaijan Energy Relations

In Eurasia, one of the most significant cooperation partners for Türkiye has been Azerbaijan. In the South Caucasus region, as clearly indicated by the Azerbaijani-Armenian confrontation that escalated in September 2020, amiable bilateral ties are situated in a turbulent foreign policy context (Ismayilov & Graham, 2016). Through their cooperation, both Türkiye and Azerbaijan have been striving to enhance their role in the Eurasian energy game. For Turkish-Azeri relations, ethnic and societal ties, congruent geo-political interests and strong personal relations at the top leadership level provide a conducive foreign policy context for fostering cooperative relations. Moreover, complementary geo-economic interests lead to the deepening of existing ties. Even if there are some problematic issues, they are more easily resolved in a cooperative setting further consolidated by energy cooperation. In this case, energy has a multiplier effect for intensifying cooperation.

Due to its rich energy resources, Azerbaijan emerged as a significant player in Eurasian energy politics. In 2019, Azerbaijani oil reserves constituted 0.4% of the world reserves, while it had 1.4% of the global natural gas reserves (BP, 2020). Since Türkiye and many European countries are striving to diversify their suppliers and supply routes, Azerbaijan has emerged as a potential complementary supplier particularly in natural gas. One of the first major energy initiatives in the region after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the independence of Azerbaijan was the BTC pipeline project. This case reveals the role of energy resources and energy supply routes as a facilitator of international cooperation. The negotiations for BTC that transfers the Azeri oil to Ceyhan, a port on the Mediterranean coast of Türkiye, started during the early 1990s. With strong support from the US government, the project began in 2002 despite fierce competition from Russia and Iran. In 2005, the construction of the pipeline was completed, and the first oil flow started the following

year. Hence, Türkiye extended its already solid cultural and historical ties with Azerbaijan to the economic realm with energy cooperation. After this promising start, Azerbaijan intensified its investments in the energy sector. Concurrently, despite lacking substantial energy resources of its own, Türkiye started its quest to become an energy corridor between the Eurasian producers and the European markets.

Turkish-Azerbaijani energy relations, especially after 2009, demonstrate how energy policy is closely tied to other foreign policy issues. For instance, on 22 April 2009, Türkiye and Armenia reached an agreement defining a provisional roadmap for the improvement of relations. This agreement disturbed Azerbaijan, which has problematic relations with Armenia due to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Only three days after the signing of this agreement, the state-owned

Azerbaijani oil and natural gas company, SOCAR, brought up demands for a new price deal in Turkish gas purchases from Azerbaijan (Haberturk, 2009). The agreement determining the existing natural gas price had expired in 2008, but Türkiye continued to buy natural gas from Azerbaijan at the old prices. Attempts for a Turkish-Armenian rapprochement created an unexpected energy crisis between Türkiye and Azerbaijan. In the subsequent weeks, when attempts to resolve the problem through technical negotiations were fruitless, then Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan had to visit Azerbaijan to ease the tensions. This dispute indicates strong ties between foreign and energy policy. Azerbaijani demands for a new price immediately after Turkish-Armenian rapprochement was diplomatic signaling to demonstrate Azeri discontent using the energy card. Hence, Erdoğan's visit to Azerbaijan highlighted Turkish-Azeri solidarity and assured Baku that Ankara would not violate Azerbaijani interests in an attempt to improve its relations with Armenia. This guarantee eased the tensions and facilitated a new price deal (Sabah, 2009).

In 2008, the EU launched the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) in response to its own geopolitical energy challenges caused by over-dependence on Russia. Consequently, the signing of the intergovernmental agreement for the Nabucco pipeline project on 13 July 2009 further consolidated bilateral energy ties between Türkiye and Azerbaijan. The Nabucco pipeline was to transport Azeri natural gas to the Eastern and Central Europe through Türkiye. However, due to the lack of throughput commitment and concerns regarding resource availability to finance and sustain the project, the regional and EU partners failed to finalize the project. Moreover, the project faced fierce Russian opposition. Since Nabucco would endanger Russian monopoly on the East-West energy corridor, Moscow tried to undermine this project by promoting the South Stream alternative and exerting pressure on Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, which were to serve as significant potential suppliers (Baev & Overland, 2010). Eventually, both the Nabucco pipeline and South Stream projects were shelved. Instead, Azerbaijan, Türkiye and European partners agreed that Azeri gas will be transferred to Europe via TANAP, which is a less ambitious but more feasible project than Nabucco (Yılmaz & Sever-Mehmetoglu, n.d.).

Türkiye and Azerbaijan signed a memorandum of understanding for the TANAP during the final week of 2011. Accordingly, annually about 16 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas will be transported, of which 6 bcm will be used in Türkiye and 10 bcm will be transferred to Europe. In fifteen years, the capacity of gas flow is expected to reach 31 bcm. In June 2012, Erdoğan and Azerbaijani President İlham Aliyev signed the deal to launch the Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline project and inaugurated it on 12 June 2018 (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018). Hence, the TANAP agreement created new opportunities for Azerbaijan, Türkiye and European countries to transfer Azeri gas to Europe.

Since Türkiye aims to diversify its energy suppliers and emerge as an energy hub, Azerbaijan has a key role in Turkish energy policies. For the Azerbaijani side, selling its natural resources to Europe via Türkiye is a desirable option as well. Moreover, SOCAR strives to expand its share in the lucrative Turkish energy market. Ultimately, both countries desire to reduce their dependency on Russia. Thus, amicable political relations between Türkiye and Azerbaijan through intensifying energy ties create synergy to reach their goals, and energy interdependence serves as an important facilitator of cooperation in Turkish-Azerbaijani relations.

Conclusion

The Türkiye–Azerbaijan partnership demonstrates how energy cooperation can transcend economic objectives to become a foundation of strategic influence and regional resilience. Through large-scale infrastructure projects such as TANAP and the Southern Gas Corridor, both states have transformed their geographic and resource advantages into tools of diplomacy, enhancing their autonomy amid shifting global power dynamics. Their evolving functional interdependence illustrates that mid-sized powers can shape regional order through connectivity rather than confrontation, leveraging energy networks to balance between competing blocs while safeguarding national interests. As Europe and Eurasia continue to face systemic uncertainty, the Türkiye–Azerbaijan model underscores the enduring value of cooperative energy diplomacy as a stabilizing force, one that empowers regional actors to exercise agency, mitigate external vulnerabilities, and contribute to a more pluralistic and interconnected global energy system.

References

- Acharya, A. (2014). *The end of American world order*. Polity Press.
- Baev, P. K., & Overland, I. (2010). The South Stream versus Nabucco Pipeline race: Geopolitical and economic (ir) rationales and political stakes in mega-projects. *International Affairs*, 86(5), 1075–1090.
- BP. (2020). *BP statistical review of world energy june 2020*. Retrieved October 14, 2020, from <https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energyeconomics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2020-full-report.pdf>
- BP. (2023). *BP statistical review of world energy june 2020*. Retrieved October 31, 2025, from <https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energyeconomics/energy-outlook/bp-energy-outlook-2023.pdf>
- Buzan, B. (2021). *Making global society: A study of humankind and world order*. Cambridge University Press.
- Colgan, J. D. (2023). *Partial hegemony: Oil politics and international order*. Oxford University Press.
- Goldthau, A., & Keating, M. F. (2018). *The politics of energy transitions*. Oxford University Press. Habertürk. (2009). *Azerbaycan'dan doğalgaz misillemesi*. Retrieved April 25, 2009, from <http://ekonomi.haberturk.com/makroekonomi/haber/142861-azerbaycandan-dogalgazmisillemesi>
- International Energy Agency. (2022). *World energy outlook 2022*.
- Ismayilov, M., & Graham, N. A. (Eds.). (2016). *Türkisch–azerbayjani relations: One nation–two states?* Routledge.
- Keohane, R. O., & Nye, J. S. (1977). *Power and interdependence*. Boston: Longman.
- Kirchner, E. J., & Berk, T. (2018). Energy security and power in europe: The role of interdependence. *European Security*, 27(1), 2–20.
- Roberts, J. (2018). Pipeline politics and the shifting geopolitics of energy. *Geopolitics*, 23(1), 1–23.
- Sabah. (2009). Erdogan tam garanti verdi, Bakünün şüphesi kalmadı . Retrieved May 14, 2009, from http://www.sabah.com.tr/Siyaset/2009/05/14/erdogan_tam_garanti_verdi_Bakunun_suphesi_kalmadi
- Shaffer, B. (2009). *Energy politics*. University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2018). *Türkiye's energy profile and strategy (tanap agreement and inauguration)*. Retrieved June 12, 2018, from <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/Türkiyes-energiystrategy.en.mfa>
- Walt, S. M. (2018). *The hell of good intentions: America's foreign policy elite and the decline of U.S. primacy*. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Yergin, D. (2020). *The new map: Energy, climate, and the clash of nations*. Penguin Press.
- Yılmaz, S., & Sever-Mehmetoglu, S. (n.d.). Linking foreign policy and energy security. *Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi*, 13(52), 105-128.

About the Authors

Belgin Şan Akca

Koç University | [bakca\[at\]ku.edu.tr](mailto:bakca[at]ku.edu.tr) | ORCID: 0000-0002-3931-7924

Belgin San-Akca is Professor and Chair of the International Relations Department at Koç University. She received her Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, Davis. San-Akca has held visiting scholar positions at Harvard University's Center for Middle Eastern Studies, the University of California, Davis, and Stanford University's Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law. Her research lies at the intersection of international security, civil wars, terrorism, and energy politics, with particular attention to how states and non-state armed actors interact in shaping global and regional security. Her work has been supported by European Commission Grants and has appeared in leading journals. She is also an Associate Editor of the Journal of Global Security Studies. Her books include *States in Disguise* (OUP, 2016) and the forthcoming *The Pursuit of Energy Security in an Insecure World*, under contract with Oxford University Press (co-authored with Suhnaz Yılmaz).

Suhnaz Yılmaz

Koç University | [syilmaz\[at\]ku.edu.tr](mailto:syilmaz[at]ku.edu.tr) | ORCID: 0000-0003-2681-2077

Suhnaz Yılmaz is Professor of International Relations and Dean of the College of Administrative Sciences and Economics at Koç University. She received her M.A. and Ph.D. from Princeton University in Near Eastern Studies and International Relations and completed postdoctoral research at Harvard University. She has held visiting positions at UCLA's Luskin School of Public Affairs, Princeton University's Center for International Studies, and Stanford University's Center for Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies. A recipient of major national and international awards, including the Turkish Academy of Sciences Distinguished Young Scientist Award and Koç University's Outstanding Teaching Award, her research spans energy and natural resource politics, sustainable development, foreign policy analysis, and Eurasian and Middle Eastern affairs. She is the author of *Turkish-American Relations (1800–1952)* (Routledge), co-author of *Energy, Environment, and Geopolitics in Eurasia* (with Norman Graham), and co-author of *The Pursuit of Energy Security in an Insecure World* (with Belgin San-Akca).